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ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays On Agricultural and Forestry Offsets In Climate Change Mitigation.  
(May 2012) 
Siyi Feng, B.S., Shandong University; 
M.S., Tsinghua University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Richard T. Woodward 
 
This dissertation is composed of three essays, investigating two aspects of the 
role of agricultural sector in climate change mitigation: leakage and additionality.  
Leakage happens when mitigation policies reduce net GHG emissions in one 
context, but increase (decrease) prices, which in turn causes production (demand) 
expansion resulting in an offsetting rise in emissions elsewhere. The first essay 
documents an integration of a US domestic agricultural sectoral model and a global 
agricultural sectoral model, with the aim to deliver better leakage assessment. The 
second essay investigates the trend of US crop yield growth and its implication on the 
international leakage effect. We find that the slowdowns have occurred to the growth 
rates of most US major crops. The implementation of climate change mitigation 
strategies, such as the expansion of bioenergy production, causes demand for the 
agricultural sector to increase substantially. The new demand would cause noticeable 
leakage effect if crop yields continue to grow at the current rates. Such effect may be 
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potentially alleviated by higher crop yield growth rates; but the extent of alleviation 
depends on the mix of technological progress obtained across crops as well.   
Additionality is often a concern in programs designed to incentivize the 
production of environmental services. Additionality is satisfied if payments are made to 
services that would not have occurred without the payment. However, because of the 
information asymmetry between service buyers and sellers, ensuring additionality poses 
a challenge to program designers. The third essay investigates how the pursuit of 
ensuring additionality would complicate environmental policy design with a theoretical 
model. Specifically, we examine 4 types of policy design, including 2 discriminating 
schemes and 2 simpler non-discriminating schemes. We found that under certain 
conditions, some of the non-discriminating schemes can be almost as good as the 
discriminating ones. 
Findings in this dissertation contribute to inform policy makers about the 
potential impacts of climate change mitigation policies in the agricultural sector and also 
help to improve understanding of environmental program design.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There is growing international consensus that the atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) 
concentrations need to be stabilized at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system (IPCC 2007). In the suite of climate 
change mitigation policies, the agricultural sector (in a broad sense that includes forestry) 
is expected to play an important role, especially in the near future when low cost 
mitigation technology in the energy sector is still under development. The agricultural 
sector is both an emitter and a sink of GHG. On one hand, deforestation, mostly caused 
by agricultural land expansion, counts for about 17% annual GHG emissions (IPCC 
2007) and emissions from fertilizer use and livestock production are also non-negligible. 
On the other hand, the agricultural sector contributes to climate change mitigation in 
both indirect ways, such as producing feedstock for bioenergy to displace fossil fuel, and 
direct ways, such as to sequester carbon through practice and land use change. To make 
the agricultural sector a net sink of GHG, policies need to be properly designed. This 
dissertation is devoted to two issues in realizing the mitigation opportunities in the 
agricultural sector: leakage and additionality. 
Leakage happens when mitigation policies reduce net GHG emissions in one 
context, but increase prices, which in turn causes production expansion resulting in an 
 
__________________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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 offsetting rise in emissions elsewhere. The global concern of leakage is raised by the 
rapid growth in bioenergy production. In the past decade, US corn usage for ethanol has 
risen from 15.9 million tons (less than 5% of the total crop) to 104 million tons (almost 
40%), causing crop prices to increase substantially (Trostle 2008, Abbott, Hurt and 
Tyner 2009). Stimulated by higher prices, corn production in the US has expanded by 
40% in the same period, both due to changes on the extensive margin (e.g., expansion of 
cropland via clearing of grassland, unprotected forest) resulting in 11% more corn 
acreage, and on the intensive margin (e.g. using improved seeds to increase yield) 
(Melillo, et al. 2009). As the agricultural market is essentially international in nature, 
substantial production expansion may have happened outside of the country boarder as 
well. Production expansion in the form of indirect land use change is of particular 
concern as large amount of carbon is currently sequestered on the potential arable land. 
Clearance of these lands would result in substantial GHG emissions, offsetting the 
benefits of bioenergy use.  
The magnitude of leakage is subject to careful scrutinization in existing literature. 
However, estimates vary widely between large and small, depending on model 
assumptions and values of key parameters used (Keeney and Hertel 2009, Schneider and 
McCarl 2006, EPA 2010). Assessment of indirect land use change (ILUC) and leakage is 
possible only when both the international effect of one country’s policy including any 
land use change plus adjustments in the country can be captured in the model. The first 
essay of this dissertation (Chapter II) makes a contribution to this discussion by 
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developing of a global partial-equilibrium agricultural sector model with a detailed US 
component. 
The second essay (Chapter III) explicitly addresses the issue of leakage, but is 
further motivated by the concern of slowdown in productivity of the US agricultural 
sector, especially the crop yield growth rates. Crop yield growth rates are a key factor in 
determining whether growing demand can be met without expanding the land base and 
therefore also the leakage effect. This essay is devoted to estimating the US crop yield 
growth trend over the past 70 years and test for existence of slowdowns. And the model 
developed in the first essay is applied to investigate the implications of technology 
progress on the international effect of US bioenergy policy. 
In the last essay (Chapter IV) we turn our attention to the issue of additionality. 
Most actual and proposed schemes to induce climate change mitigation involve a cap-
and-trade schemes that have geographical and sectoral coverage limits, oftentimes 
accompanied by an offset component that allows the capped sectors satisfy their 
obligations by paying uncapped sources to reduce their emissions. The environmental 
integrity of such programs requires that additionality be satisfied.  In other words, the 
reductions have to be those that would not have been generated without payment. 
However, in reality, it is very difficult to weed out non-additional reductions from 
additional reductions because of problems of asymmetric information. The concern of 
additionality is prevalent in all kinds of payment for environmental service programs. 
The last essay is devoted to examine how to achieve additionality in policy design with a 
theoretical model. Specifically, four contract designs, including the second best 
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screening-contract and the often discussed baseline method, are investigated in the 
situation in which the service buyer knows the existence but not the specific sources of 
the non-additional services and aims to minimize the costs of procuring given amount of 
additional environmental services. 
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CHAPTER II 
INTEGRATION OF FASOM AND GLOBIOM 
1. Introduction 
The development of bioenergy is proceeding around the world for at least four reasons: 
energy security, low costs compared to fossil fuel prices, policy incentives and climate 
change mitigation benefits. The US is the largest ethanol producer and continues to 
promote biofuel use through polices, such as the Renewable Fuel Standard and blender’s 
credit subsidies. Similar policies can also be found in other countries.  Ethanol is a "first 
generation" biofuel (Zinoviev et al. 2007) which uses corn (or sugarcane in Brazil) as a 
feedstock and this corn use competes directly with grain production for food demand.  
The direct competition has consequences. Crop prices increase worldwide and 
this can exacerbate food insecurity problems in developing countries. On the 
environmental side, the potential climate change mitigation benefits are argued to be 
compromised because of leakage effects (Murray et al. 2007, Searchinger et al. 2008, 
Fargione et al. 2008). Leakage happens when higher crop prices encourage other regions 
to increase production through intensification or deforestation both of which are 
associated with more greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, leakage is international in 
nature owing to international trade.  
As deforestation contributes approximately 17% greenhouse gas emissions 
annually (IPCC 2007), leakage in the form of indirect land use change (ILUC) is subject 
to careful investigations in the academic community (Fargione, et al. 2008, Searchinger, 
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et al. 2008). Assessment of ILUC and leakage is possible only when both the 
international effect of one country’s policy including any land use change plus 
adjustments in the country can be captured in the model.  Existing assessments vary 
widely because of different modeling methods and assumptions employed (see 
discussion in Keeney and Hertel (2009), and Schneider and McCarl (2006)). One of the 
major tradeoffs in these models is geographical coverage versus the level of details in 
technologies, market structure and so on. This yields widely variable leakage estimates. 
Our modeling exercise makes contribution to the leakage estimate by developing 
a global model with a detailed US component. We integrate the US Forest and 
Agricultural Sector Optimization Model (FASOM) and the Global Biomass 
Optimization Model (GLOBIOM), resulting in a model that is capable of carrying out a 
comprehensive assessment of the international effects of US agricultural policies.  
Rather than answering a specific research question, this essay documents 
modifications undertaken to establish the integrated FASOM-GLOBIOM model. In the 
following sections, we will first describe the scope of the integrated model. We then 
describe the underlying economic principles and adjustments made to achieve the 
integration followed by discussion of the model’s aggregation and calibration. Finally, 
we provide overview of the model equations and variables. 
2. Conceptual Scope of the Integrated FASOM-GLOBIOM Model  
The integrated FASOM-GLOBIOM model is a multi-period, recursive dynamic, price 
endogenous mathematical programming model depicting resource allocations of the 
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agricultural and forestry sector of the world. The model portrays market equilibrium for 
each of the period on a 10-year time step basis. Key endogenous variables include: 
 Commodity and factor prices, 
 Production, consumption, export and import quantities, 
 Land use decisions between and within sectors, 
 Management strategies, 
 Resource use, 
 Economic welfare measures, and  
 Environmental impact indicators—emission associated with land use 
change and fertilizer use. 
The conceptual structure of the integrated FASOM-GLOBIOM model (the FG 
model hereafter) is shown in figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual Structure of the Integrated FASOM-GLOBIOM Model (Developed based on Havlik et al. (2010) and 
McCarl and Sands (2007)) 
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2.1 Geographic Scope 
In the FG model, the US is broken into the 11 market regions used in FASOM (table 2.1, 
adopted from (Adams et al. 2005)). For most of the commodities, production, livestock 
feeding and processing are modeled for 11 regions and demand is modeled on the 
national scale. 
Table 2.1: US Region Definition 
Key Region States/Subregions 
CB Corn Belt All regions in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio 
NP Northern Plains Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota 
LS Lake States Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin  
NE Northeast Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia 
PNWE Pacific 
Northwest-east 
side 
Oregon and Washington, east of the Cascade mountain range 
PNWW Pacific 
Northwest-west 
side 
Oregon and Washington, west of the Cascade mountain range 
PSW Pacific 
Southwest 
All regions in California 
RM Rocky 
Mountains 
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Eastern Oregon, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Utah, Eastern Washington, Wyoming 
SC South Central Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Eastern Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Eastern Texas (TxEast)  
SE Southeast Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida 
SW Southwest Western and Central Oklahoma, All of Texas but the Eastern Part -- Texas 
High Plains, Texas Rolling Plains, Texas Central Blacklands, Texas Edwards 
Plateau, Texas Coastal Bend, Texas South, TexasTrans Pecos 
 The rest of the world is broken into 27 regions, largely based on GLOBIOM 
which uses many of the same regions as FASOM (table 2.2). For most of the 
commodities, production is modeled based on land grids, which are defined by their 
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geographical characteristics in the countries and demand is modeled on the regional 
scale. 
Table 2.2: Rest of World Region Definition 
 Region Countries 
1 ANZ Australia, New Zealand 
2 BrazilReg Brazil 
3 CanadaReg Canada 
4 ChinaReg China 
5 CongoBasin Cameron, Central Africa, Congo Republic, Equator Guinea, Gabon  
6 EU_Baltic Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
7 EU_CentralEast Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
8 EU_MidWest Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands 
9 EU_North Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom 
10 EU_South Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain 
11 FormerUSSR Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan, Moldova 
Republic, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmen, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
12 IndiaReg India 
13 JapanReg Japan 
14 MexicoReg Mexico 
15 MidEastNorthAfr Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
Yeman 
16 Pacific_Islands American Samoa, Fiji Islands, French Polynesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu 
17 RCAM Antigua Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago    
18 RCEU Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro 
19 ROWE Andorra, Faeroes, Gibraltar, Greenland, Iceland, Isle of Man, Monaco, Norway, 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein   
20 RSAM Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, 
Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, Venezuela 
21 RSAS Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal 
22 RSEA_PAC Vietnam, Cambodia, Korea (North), Laos, Mongolia  
23 RSEA_OPA Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore 
24 SouthAfrReg South Africa 
25 SouthKorea South Korea 
26 SubSaharanAfr Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, St. Helene, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe   
27 TurkeyReg Turkey 
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2.2 Input Scope  
In FG there are several major inputs which involve land, labor and water. Each is 
discussed below. 
2.2.1 Land Type 
Land in each region is broken into two main categories, agricultural land and forest land.  
Agricultural land is further divided into four major types: cropland, grassland, plantation 
forest and other. Plantation forest refers to land for short rotation coppice (SRP), which 
is grown as energy crop and used for feedstock for the second generation biofuels. The 
type “other” is mostly marginal land or arable land in reserve. There are two types of 
forest land: primary forest and managed forest. Primary forest does not generate 
economic returns, but could be turned into productive land types, such as agricultural 
land or managed forest, although in some cases deforestation is involved. 
The initial land acreage allocation is determined by the data in GLOBIOM for 
international cases and those in FASOM for the US. In turn, land use is determined by 
the relative net economic returns of competing activities. Land transfers have 
greenhouse gas emissions implications. Particularly when primary forests are cleared for 
cropland or grassland, substantial GHG emissions result, mainly in the form of lost 
carbon sequestration. In this way, the model can estimate carbon leakage in regions with 
large amount of primary forests, such as Brazil. 
2.2.2 Non-land Inputs 
Non-land inputs explicitly modeled in the FG model include fertilizer and water. 
Fertilizer use and irrigation choice (irrigation versus rain-fed) along with land allocation 
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together determine yields and total production of the commodities. Associated with this 
modeling, we do environmental accounting on N, P and K run off and non-CO2 GHG 
emissions and we are also able to investigate the internal value of water availability. 
Labor availability is also modeled in the US part of the model. 
2.3 Commodity Scope 
The FG model uses the commodity scopes of its component models. Seventeen major 
crops are simulated in GLOBIOM. Corn, soybean and wheat are the three most 
important crops in the US and these are the ones included in FASOM. Five species of 
wheat are included: soft white, hard red winter, soft red winter, durum and hard red 
spring. FASOM has five types of crop demand for the US: domestic demand, processing, 
livestock feed mixing, biofuel production and net export.
1
 Processing and production of 
secondary commodities are included either to represent substitution or to depict demand 
for component products (Adams et al. 2005). The GLOBIOM model has four demand 
categories: domestic demand consisting of direct demand and demand for processing, 
livestock feed mixing, biofuel production and net exports. The integrated model has 
inherited the detailed modeling on the production side in the US, but the modeling in the 
GLOBIOM part is somewhat less detailed. As will be explained in detail in Section 3, 
the demand side, especially the US export demand and import supply components of 
international trade.  
A comprehensive list of crops and livestock products modeled is presented in 
table 2.3. 
                                                 
1
 If net export is negative, i.e. import, then it could be regarded as supply. 
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Table 2.3: List of Crops and Livestock Products 
27 Regions around the World 
Excluding US (Abbreviations) 
 
US 
Crops 
Barley (BARL)  Corn Oranges 
Dry beans (BEAD)  Soybeans Grapefruits 
Cassava (CASS)  Soft white wheat  
Chickpeas (CHKP)  Hard red winter wheat  
Corn (CORN)  Soft red winter wheat  
Cotton (COTT)  Durum wheat  
Ground nuts (GNUT)  Hard red spring wheat  
Millet (MILL)  Cotton  
Potatoes (POTA)  Sorghum  
Rapeseed (RAPE)  Barley  
Rice (RICE)  Potato  
Soybeans (SOYA)  Rice  
Sorghum (SRGH)  Sugarcane  
Sugarcane (SUGC)  Oats  
Sunflower (SUNF)  Hay  
Sweet potatoes (SWPO)  Sugar beets  
Wheat(WHEA)  Canola (this is rapeseed)  
    
Livestock Products  Primary Livestock Commodities 
Buffalo  Non Fed Slaughter Heifer Calves 
Cattle  Feed Lot Beef Slaughter Stocked Calves 
Sheep  Calf Slaughter Stocked Heifer Calves 
Goats  Cull Beef Cow Stocked Steer Calves 
Shoat  Raw Milk Dairy Calves 
Pig  Cull Dairy Cow Stocked Yearling 
Poultry  Hogs for Slaughter Stocked Heifer Yearling 
  Feeder Pig Stocked Steer Yearling 
  Cull Sows Horses and Mules 
  Lamb Slaughter Eggs 
  Cull Ewes Broilers 
  Raw Wool Turkeys 
  Steer Calves  
  Secondary Livestock Commodities 
  Fed Beef Evaporated Condensed Milk 
  Non Fed Beef Non Fat Dry Milk 
  Pork Butter 
  Chicken  American Cheese 
  Turkeys Other Cheese 
  Clean Wool Cottage Cheese 
  Fluid Milk Ice Cream 
  Skim Milk Cream 
There are two main outputs of the agricultural sector not included in table 2.3. 
Biofuel products included in the model include the first generation biofuel--crop ethanol 
and biodiesel-- and second generation biofuel—cellulosic ethanol. Modeling of the 
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forest sector is completely based on GLOBIOM, which contains two types of forest land: 
primary forest and managed forest.  Five types of products are produced from managed 
forest: saw logs, pulp logs, other industrial logs, pulp logs and biomass for energy. 
3.  Underlying Economic Principles and Achieving the Integration 
In this section, we discuss the economic principles underlying the model and highlight 
features that make the integration possible.
2
  
3.1 Competitive Behavior Simulation and Welfare Maximization 
A mathematical representation of the FG model is presented in equations 2.1-2.5 (see 
notation in table 2.4). The model maximizes the sum of producer’s profit and consumer 
surplus on a global basis (equation 2.1) in a recursive dynamic framework.  This is 
essentially based on the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics (see detailed 
discussion in McCarl and Spreen (1980)). Its solution is a Pareto Optimal market 
equilibrium when the market is perfectly competitive, thus predicting equilibrium market 
prices and quantities.  
There are four important sets of constraints, equations 2.2 - 2.5. The first 
constraints are a set of supply demand balance equations for various commodities 
(equation 2.2), forcing supply to be no less than demand. Second, a set of resource 
constraints and a set of technology constraints (equation 2.3 and 2.4) represent the 
feasible set of production. The recursive dynamics is introduced in equation 2.5. This 
                                                 
2
 Most of these features are implemented in file intltradeconvert.gms (if not indicated specifically) which 
will be called in the main file 41_model_structure.gms that defines the model. 
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equation tracks the changes of land use over time—namely, the availability of one land 
type in period t equals the land in this category in the period (t-1) plus land coming into 
the category at period t minus land leaving the category. And notations of the equations 
are explained in table 2.4. 
 
   
* *
h iQ X
h h t h t h, , h, , ,t i t i t
h h i0 0
max P Q dQ TC NE P X dX
 
        
   
 

      
 [2.1] 
s.t. 
h t h, , ,t h k kt
k
Q NE c Z 0, h,    
  

 
       [2.2] 
i k kt i t
k
a Z X 0, i,     
 [2.3] 
j k kt j t
k
b Z Y j,    
 [2.4] 
l , ,( t 1 ) l ,l ,t l , l ,t l , ,t
l l
Y LUC LUC Y , l   
 
    
 [2.5] 
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Table 2.4: Notation Used in Analytical Representation of the FG Model 
Notation Description 
h index for commodities (table 2.3) 
β the smaller production regions and land grids 
γ 
the 28 regions that aggregates the β’s and has an 
aggregated demand curve for every commodity 
k processing possibilities 
i purchased inputs 
j endowed inputs 
l a subset of j that denotes different land types 
t time period 
 h h tP Q   the inverse demand curve for commodity h in region γ 
 i tP X   the inverse supply curve for input i in region β 
h, ,TC    
transport cost per unit of commodity h from region γ to 
region – γ 
h, , ,tNE    
transportation (export) of commodity h from region γ to 
region – γ 
h tQ    total demand of commodity h of region γ at period t 
i tX   purchased input i of region β at period t 
j tY   endowed input j of region β at period t 
ktZ  
the amount of production technology employed using 
process k by in region βat period t 
h k i k j k( c ,a ,b )    
represents yield data associated with Z with h kc   being 
the yield parameter for output h and i ka   being the input 
use parameters of land and other endowed input and j kb 
being it for purchased inputs 
3.2 Assuring Product Consistency 
The modeled regions interact with each other through trade flows. To link the 
GLOBIOM international model with the FASOM national US model, the first step is to 
deactivate the US part in the global model and then link the two models by equating 
their US incoming and outgoing trade variables. To establish the equality, the variables 
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of the two component models need to be in consistent units; and consistent in what they 
are measuring. For example, the net export of soybeans of the US in the GLOBIOM 
model measures raw soybeans export from the US plus soybeans used in exported 
processed commodities (mainly soybean meal and soybean oil) while that in the 
FASOM model measures raw soybeans export from the US only. And therefore a 
procedure to further deal with this difference is needed.  
Trade of eight crops between the US and rest of the world is explicitly modeled. 
These crops are corn, soybean, wheat, barley, potato, rice, sorghum and sugarcane. The 
differing commodity names are mapped through a tuple, and a unit conversion parameter 
(table 2.5) is included.
3
 In turn, commodity price data are converted into a consistent 
base, and then transportation costs defined as price difference between regions are 
updated. 
4
 
                                                 
3
 On the FASOM side, commodities not included in table 3.3 are modeled as what they used to be, that is 
their international trade is determined by a single excess supply/demand curve. On the GLOBIOM side, 
for those commodities that do not have counterparts in FASOM but do have small amount of 
import/export, these import/export are represented by a vertical demand/supply curve with quantity fixed 
at the GLOBIOM solution value. 
4
 These steps are implemented in file 40_ModelUpdate.gms. 
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Table 2.5: Unit Conversion of the Integrated Model 
Crop in FASOM Unit in 
FASOM 
Crop in 
GLOBIOM 
Unit in 
GLOBIOM 
GLOBIOM units per 
unit in FASOM 
Barley Bushel BARL Tonne 45.930 
Potatoes CWT POTA Tonne 22.046 
Soybeans Bushel SOYA Tonne 36.744 
Sorghum CWT SRGH Tonne 22.046 
Corn Bushel CORN Tonne 31.495 
Rice CWT RICE Tonne 22.046 
Soft White Wheat Bushel WHEA Tonne 36.744 
Hard Red Winter Wheat Bushel WHEA Tonne 36.744 
Durum Wheat Bushel WHEA Tonne 36.744 
Hard Red Spring Wheat Bushel WHEA Tonne 36.744 
Soft Red Winter Wheat Bushel WHEA Tonne 36.744 
Sugarcane US tons SUGC Tonne   1.102 
In addition to unit conversion, further modifications are made to insure 
consistency for two crops: soybeans and wheat. 
 So far, linkages are established only for crops not for livestock products, as the 
modeling of livestock is highly aggregated in the GLOBIOM component compared to 
that in the FASOM component. The US exports approximate 10% of its beef production 
annually and most of the trade happens between developed countries, which have slow 
economic growth and stable population. Therefore, we use a simple method to 
approximate this part of supply from the country. We solve the original GLOBIOM 
model and use the solution of livestock export of US as vertical excess supply curve to 
rest of the world. 
 Soybeans 
The majority of the world’s soybeans are crushed and separated for oil and 
protein meal. This makes markets of the secondary commodities of soybeans as 
important as or even more important than the soybean market. The US crushes more 
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than half of its soybean production, and exports 8.3 million metric tons of soybean meal 
and 1.3 metric ton of soybean oil in addition to 40 metric tons of raw soybeans each year 
in recent years. The export of soybean meal accounts for 23% of domestic production 
and 15% of the world market share and the shares for soybean oil are 14% and 13% 
respectively.
5
 Together, they are equivalent to 495 million metric tons of soybeans—
more than ten times the raw soybean exports of the country.
6
 
Ideally, the model should reflect crushing technology possibilities plus the fact 
that demand for soybeans is determined in three different markets. However, neither 
model component includes complete global soybean meal and soybean oil data. We use 
a compromise method in which exports of primary commodities and processed 
commodities from the US are added together before they enter the international trade 
flow.  
To forecast US exports of soybean meal and oil, we first use an extrapolation of 
historical data. Namely we find the best fit time trend for US soybean meal and soybean 
oil. In turn then in the model we force total soybean imports of the rest of the world to be 
equal the sum of the exports of raw soybeans plus the soybean equivalent amount of 
total soybean meal and oil exports of the US. We do not impose the transportation cost 
for the soybean meal and oil export; instead we add an ancillary restriction that for every 
US soybean buying trading partner that total soybean imports must be no less than the 
volume of raw soybean imports. 
                                                 
5
 Data source: http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/Create_Federal_All.jsp and 
http://www.indexmundi.com/. 
6
 Source of conversion rate: http://www.ussec.org/resources/conversions.html   
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 Wheat 
FASOM models five different types of wheat corresponding to the more detailed 
classification of the crop while GLOBIOM models wheat as one crop. The production 
shares of the different types have been fairly stable and the price difference between the 
most expensive and the cheapest has been around 20% to 30% for more than 20 years
7
-- 
this implies that they are close substitutes for some types of demand but not so for others.  
The synchronization of wheat across the two models is done in three steps. First, 
we find the FASOM optimal type mix of wheat trade between US subregions and 
different regions of ROW
8
 for the year 2000. Secondly, we calculate the national type 
mix of wheat production of US from historical data available on USDA.  Finally, we add 
in restrictions that the production mix and the export mix of the US are in strict 
proportion to historical ones and assume that will hold for the entire modeling period.  
3.3 Dynamic Adjustment 
GLOBIOM is a recursive dynamic model with period length of 10 years, with results 
from one period feeding into the next one.  FASOM is a multi-period fully dynamic 
model with period length of 5 years. The recursive dynamic method used in GLOBIOM 
is essentially assuming that the sector being modeled is in equilibrium within each of the 
periods and therefore does not allow forward looking behavior beyond the period length 
(McCarl and Spreen 1980). Due to the difference in dynamics, changes were required to 
make the two model components compatible.   
                                                 
7
 Data source: http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/Create_Federal_All.jsp. 
8
 A small amount of work on mapping the regions are required due to the difference in the region divisions 
of the two models.  
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3.3.1 Land Use Change 
Land use change in the FG model is shown in figure 2.2. The arrows represent directions 
of land use change, namely land type at the tail of the arrow can be transferred into land 
type at the head of the arrow. Land types linked by double head arrow can be transferred 
into each other. The arrow with a dashed line represents land use change excluded in the 
model.  
 
Figure 2.2: Land Use Change in the Integrated FG Model 
The difference between recursive dynamics and full dynamics can be best 
demonstrated in the modeling of land use change. The optimal land use is determined by 
comparing the net present values of net return among all the possible uses. In the case of 
comparing the forest land and agricultural land, it involves comparing benefit flows that 
extend for several decades if the model were fully dynamic. However, in a recursive 
dynamic model like ours, what are being compared are benefit flows within the time 
interval of one simulation step. For example, the decision to clear primary forest for 
agricultural land, i.e. deforestation (represented by Arrow 1) in our model neglects the 
Forest Land Agricultural Land Natural Land 
Primary Forest 
Managed Forest 
Cropland Grassland 
Plantation Forest (SPR) 
Natural land in 
rest of the world 
CRP land in 
the US 
1 
2 
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benefits generated by the forest beyond the simulation step. This neglect is valid here 
because (1) our simulation step is has a duration of 10 years and therefore short-run 
returns will still be captured; and (2) most primary forest clearance happens in 
developing countries in which the opportunities cost of holding land in forest is 
increasing over time and the long-run direct economic returns of primary forests is likely 
to be further neglected because of insecure tenure rights, especially at the local 
community level (Geist and Lambin 2002). Our modeling method precludes the 
modeling of afforestation (represented by Arrow 2). 
Land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the US is marginal 
land retired from production. Land owners receive payments from the government by 
enrolling their land in the program. Acreage of the CRP land in the model is based on 
the 2000 sign up. Contract length of the enrollment is 10 years, with possibility to extend. 
The time step of the integrated model is approximately the same as the contract length; 
therefore, enrollment in the CRP program is modeled as a static decision. 
Variables l , ,tY   and l ,l ,tLUC  in equation 2.5 in Section 3.1 represents the 
recursive dynamics in the model correspond to availability of each land type and land 
use changes at each simulation period respectively.  
4. Model Calibration 
To aggregate and calibrate the FG model, crop mixes on a global scale are required to be 
a convex combination of historical crop mixes, a method proposed by McCarl (1982). 
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This method restricts the crop mix to the space spanned by a convex combination of 
historical crop mixes.  
Then to further calibrate the model, the gap between the marginal cost of 
production and marginal revenue is closed using the method discussed in Fajardo et al.’s 
(1981) model of Nicaraguan agriculture. If perfect competition were assumed, farmers 
would produce to the point where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC).  
However, farmers may be constrained by information availability marketing and other 
factors affecting farmers that are not included in the model. Hence the MC revealed in 
the model may differ from the true one. Omitting the constraints will cause a gap 
between MR and MC. To close this gap, restrictions that force the observed land use, 
crop mix, livestock mix and forestry mix to be optimal solution of the model are 
imposed; in turn, the shadow prices of these restrictions could be regarded as the cost 
that is not taken into account (following a procedure like that used in the Howitt 
(1995)—Positive Mathematical Programming (the PMP method)). Later, these shadow 
prices are added into the crop production budgets as additional costs. 
9
 For more 
discussions on the aggregation and calibration methods, please refer to the paper written 
by Wiborg et al. (2005). 
If international trade were dictated by the law of one price, we could have a good 
simulation of the real world up to this point. However, this is not the case. Trade flows 
are heavily affected by other factors, such as tariff and preference differences. Also 
                                                 
9
 This method is partly implemented in the data preparation and partly in equations FORCE_LAND, 
FORCE_LUC, FORCE_LIVESTOCK, FORCE4, FORCE_FW and FORCE_ACAL_SUP in file 
42_caibration_1.gms.  
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national food self-sufficiency goals play a role.  As a consequence, actual productions of 
certain crops in specific regions are found to be higher than that revealed by the model 
solution and most of these crops are staple food of the region. In this case, import quotas 
were imposed so that a large proportion of domestic demand has to be met by domestic 
production. And the import quota is set at 120% of the observed for the period of 2000. 
The commodities and regions for which this was done are listed in table 2.6. 
Table 2.6: Import Quotas Imposed in the FG Model 
Crop Region 
Barley EU_Baltic, EU_South, ROWE 
Corn EU_South, Sub-Saharan Africa 
Rice Japan, South Korea, Middle East and North Africa 
Sorghum Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa 
Potato Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sugarcane Sub-Saharan Africa 
5. Data, Model Equations and Variables 
As the integrated model is built on the FASOM model and GLOBIOM model, data 
description of the integrated model can be found in Adam et al. (2005) for the FASOM 
part and Havlik et al. (2010) for the GLOBIOM part. Overviews of equations and 
variables in the model are presented in table 2.7 and table 2.8 respectively.
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Table 2.7: Overview of Equations of the FG Model 
Equation Name Description 
AGCRPACREUP 
Limits crop mix in the US and are explained in FASOM 
(Adams et al, 2005). 
AGCRPMIXC 
AGCRPMIXCTRAN 
AGCRPMIXLO 
AGCRPMIXUP 
AGCRPREVERTCONVEX 
Linearizes the reversion of CRP with increasing, convex 
costs in the US. 
AGCRPREVERTEQ Identity that calculates total CRP reversion in the US. 
AGCRPREVERTLIM Limits regional maximum CRP reversion in the US. 
AGCRPREVERTNATLIM Limits national maximum CRP reversion in the US. 
AGGRAZINGUSEEQ Calculates agricultural land for animal grazing in the US. 
AGLIVESTOCKMIXNAT 
Limits livestock mixes must be in the convex cone of 
historical data in the US. 
AGMANUREMGT 
Computes GHG emission related to manure management 
in the US. 
AGMAXPASTURETOCROP Limits maximum amount of reversion in the US.  
AGPASTLANDEXCHANGE 
The accounting equation of land transfer between pasture 
and cropland in the US. Refer to equation 
LUCDET_EQU for detailed explanation. 
AGPROCESSMAXPURCHINPUT 
Limits inputs available for processing in the US.  AGPROCESSMAXPURCHINPUTREL 
AGPROCESSMINPURCHINPUT 
AGPROCESSNATMAXPROD Limits the production level of the processed 
commodities in the US. AGPROCESSNATMINPROD 
AGPRODBAL  Commodity demand supply balance in the US. 
AGRESBALANCE Calculates water and labor use in the US. 
AGRESCONVEX 
Convexity equation for resource use in the US and refer 
to equation DEMAND_CONVEXITY for explanation of 
convexity equation. 
AGRESIDENTITY 
Sets total resource supply to that arising from the step 
variables in the US.  
AGRESMAX 
Limits the usage to be no more than maximum available 
in the US.   
AGSDCONVEX 
Convexity equation for commodity supply and demand 
in the US and refer to equation 
DEMAND_CONVEXITY for explanation of convexity 
equation. 
AGSDIDENTITY 
Sets total commodity demand and supply to that arising 
from the step variables in the US.  
BASE_BIOEN_DEMAND1 
Impose estimated base bioenergy production.  
BASE_BIOEN_DEMAND2 
COFIRESTEPALLPROCESS Impose co-fire limits in the US. 
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Table 2.7_Continued: Overview of Equations of the FG Model 
Equation Name Description 
COFIRESTEPREGPROCESS Impose co-fire limits in the US. 
COPRFEEDMAX_EQU 
Limits biofuel co-product use for feeding use if 
appropriate. 
CROP_SHARE_MAX 
Limits crop mixes must be in the convex cone of 
historical data. 
CROPLAND_EQU Limits total cropland no greater than its availability. 
CROPLANDUSE_EQU 
Limits shares of crop land of different management 
practices.  
DEFOR_CONTROL 
Control whether, where and how much deforestation is 
allowed.  
DEFORLOGS_EQU Calculates logs from deforestation. 
DEMAND_CONVEXITY 
A convexity equation that is used in representing the area 
under the demand curves in a linear fashion allowing the 
problem to be solved as a linear program for time 
reasons.  This uses separable programming as explained 
in Baumes and McCarl.  
DEMAND_IDENTITY 
An identity equation sums over all the steps and obtains 
total demand. 
DS_BALANCE Commodity demand supply balance. 
EQU_CALI_EXPORT1 
Impose import and export quotas. 
EQU_CALI_EXPORT2 
EQU_CALI_IMPORT1 
EQU_CALI_IMPORT2 
EQU_CALI_PRODUCTIONA 
Computes deviation of land allocation from that 
observed. 
EQU_CORNEXPSTEP1 
Separable programming for US corn export. 
EQU_CORNEXPSTEP2 
EQU_FEEDUP Impose upper bound of feed use. 
EXG_FOOD_DEMAND1 Imposes food requirements on crops. 
EXG_FOOD_DEMAND2 Imposes food requirements on meat. 
EXG_FOOD_DEMAND3 Imposes food requirements on calories. 
EXG_WOOD_DEMAND Imposes wood product demand requirements 
EXPCONVERT Unit conversion of different trade variables. 
EXPCONVERT1 
An identity equation sums over all the steps and obtains 
total export. 
FEED_BALANCE 
Deals with feeding of livestock. FEED_BALANCEILRI 
FEED_BALANCELOC 
FORCED_SOLU_EXP Fix US export/import modeled in GLOBIOM but not in 
FASOM. FORCED_SOLU_IMP 
FORCEREGPROCESS  
Limits the production level of the processed 
commodities in the US. 
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Table 2.7_Continued: Overview of Equations of the FG Model 
Equation Name Description 
GRAS_BALANCE Deals with feeding of livestock. 
GRASLAND_EQU Limits total grassland no greater than its availability. 
HARVLAND_EQU 
Limits total managed forest no greater than its 
availability. 
IMPCONVERT Unit conversion of different trade variables. 
INTCROPMIXEQULO 
Limits crop mixes in 27 regions excluding US. 
INTCROPMIXEQUUP 
LUCDET_CONVEXITY 
Convexity equation for land use change in 27 regions 
excluding US and refer to equation 
DEMAND_CONVEXITY for explanation of convexity 
equation. 
LUCDET_EQU 
The accounting equation for land use change; namely,  
type type
type type
Area LandTransferLeaving
LandTransferCoimgin BaseArear type0,

      
and typeBaseArear   is updated each solve by 
type typeBaseArear Area . 
LUCDET_IDENTITY 
An identity equation sums over all the steps and obtains 
total land use change. 
MAXSAWLOG_EQU 
Limits harvested logs.  MAXTHWLOG_EQU 
MAXTSWLOG_EQU 
MINLIVESTOCK_EQU Deals with feeding of livestock. 
NOTRADEUSREGIONA 
Fix US export/import modeled in FASOM but not in 
GLOBIOM. 
NOTRADEUSREGIONB 
NOTRADEUSREGIONC 
NOTRADEUSREGIOND 
OBJECTIVE_EQU 
Computes the sum of the agricultural consumer’s plus 
producer’s surplus across all of the model regions. This 
consists of the area under the product demand curves 
minus the area under the explicit input supply curves.  
Production cost, processing cost and transportation cost 
are also subtracted.  
OBLIG4PRD_EQU 
Forces minimum levels of production of forest products 
not represented in the objective function.  
POLES_ENGSCEN_EQU Bioenergy production as defined in POLES scenarios. 
RESOURCE_CONVEXITY 
Convexity equation for resource use and refer to 
equation DEMAND_CONVEXITY for explanation of 
convexity equation. 
RESOURCE_IDENTITY 
Sets total resource supply to that arising from the step 
variables.  
SOYBEANADJ1 
Aggregates exports of raw soybeans, soybean meal and 
soybeans oil of US, see explanation in Section 3.2. 
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Table 2.7_Continued: Overview of Equations of the FG Model 
Equation Name Description 
SOYBEANADJ2 
Aggregates exports of raw soybeans, soybean meal and 
soybeans oil of US, see explanation in Section 3.2. 
SOYBEANADJ3 Projects US exports of soybean meal and soybean oil. 
SRPLAND_EQU 
Limits total land for short rotation coppice no greater 
than its availability. 
SRPSUIT_EQU 
Limits short rotation coppice land to be no greater than 
total land suitable for its plantation.  
STOVER_BALANCE Deals with feeding of livestock. 
SUBSFARMING_EQU 
Fixes the amount of subsistence farming to be equal to 
that observed. 
TRADECOST_CONVEXITY 
Convexity equation for net export and refer to equation 
DEMAND_CONVEXITY for explanation of convexity 
equation. 
TRADECOST_IDENTITY 
Sets total net export to that arising from the step 
variables.  
WATER_ACCOUNT Calculates and limits water usage.  
WELFAR_USFASOM     
Similar to OBJECTIVE_EQU, but only computes the 
surpluses in the US. 
WHEATADJ 
Forces wheat to be the major feedstock of bioenergy in 
the former USSR region. 
WHEATRATIO 
Forces US wheat export follows specific species mix, see 
explanation in Section 3.2. 
WHEATRATIO_PRODUCTION 
Forces US wheat production follows specific species 
mix, see explanation in Section 3.2. 
Table 2.8: Overview of Variables of the FG Model 
Variable Name Description 
AGCROPBUDGET Variable calculates crop budgets in the US. 
AGCRPMIX Variable for crop mix by irrigation type in the US. 
AGCRPREVERT Variable calculates CRP reversion in the US. 
AGCRPREVERTS Variable for linearization of CRP reversion in the US. 
AGDEMAND Variable calculates commodity demand in the US. 
AGDEMANDS 
Variable for linearization of commodity demand in the 
US. 
AGDEMARTIF Artificial production to meet demand.  
AGIDLELANDPASTURE Variable calculates idle land pasture in the US. 
AGLIVEMIX Variable for livestock mix in the US. 
AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR Variable calculates livestock budgets in the US. 
AGLVSTMANURE Variable for improved manure use in the US. 
AGMIXR Variable for crop mix in the US. 
AGMIXR_AUG Variable allows for augmented crop mix in the US. 
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Table 2.8_Continued: Overview of Variables of the FG Model 
Variable Name Description 
AGPASTLNDUSECHG 
Variable calculates agricultural land use change in the 
US. 
AGPROCESS Variable calculates processing budgets in the US. 
AGREGPROCESS 
Variable calculates regional processing budgets in the 
US. 
AGREGPROCESSPEN 
Variable calculates regional process cofire penetration 
budgets in the US. 
AGRESSEPSUPPLY 
Variable for linearization of regional non-land resource 
supply in the US. 
AGRESSUPPLY 
Variable calculates regional non-land resource supply in 
the US. 
AGSUPPLY Variable for commodity import of the US. 
AGSUPPLYS 
Variable for linearization of commodity import of the 
US. 
AGTRADE Variable calculates international trade. 
AGTRADE_EXP Variable calculates US commodity export. 
AGTRADE_EXPS Variable for linearization of US commodity export. 
AGTRADE_IMP Variable calculates US commodity import. 
AGTRANSPRIM 
Variable calculates commodity transfer between regions 
and the nation in the US. 
AGUSEGRAZING Variable calculates grazing resource use in the US. 
ART_VAR Artificial variables. 
ARTAGCRPMIXLO  Artificial variables to meet mix minimum. 
ARTAGLIVESTOCKMIXNAT  Artificial for national mix. 
ARTAGPROCESSMAXPURCHINPUT Artificial for forced biofuel processing.  
ARTAGPROCESSMINPROD  Artificial for forced biofuel processing. 
ARTFORCEREGPROCESS  Artificial for force in regional processes. 
ARTREGDEVELOPMENTFOR  Artificial regional development. 
ARTRELIEVEAGGRAZINGUSEEQ  Artificial grazing  
CROP_VAR Variable calculates acreage of crops. 
CSPS 
Sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus of the 
world. 
DEMAND_STEP Variable for linearization of commodity demand. 
DQUANTITY Variable calculates commodity demand. 
FEEDQUANTITY Variable calculates feed quantity. 
GRAS_VAR Variable calculates acreage of grassland. 
HARVEST_VAR Variable calculates acreage of harvested forest. 
INTCROPMIXVAR Variable for crop mix in 27 regions excluding US. 
LANDAVAIL_VAR Variable tracks land availability of all types. 
LIVE_VAR Variable calculates livestock production. 
LUCDET_STEP Variable for linearization of land use change. 
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Table 2.8_Continued: Overview of Variables of the FG Model 
Variable Name Description 
LUCDET_VAR Variable calculates land use change. 
PQUANTITY Variable calculates supply of processed commodities. 
RESOURCE_STEP Variable for linearization of non-land resource use. 
RESOURCE_VAR Variable calculates non-land resource use. 
SHIPMENTS Variable for international trade. 
SPR_VAR Variable calculates acreage of short rotation coppice. 
SQUANTITY 
Variable calculates supply of composite livestock 
products. 
SQUANTITY_DEFOR 
Variable calculates quantity of biomass produced from 
primary forest clearance. 
SQUANTITY_FOREST 
Variable calculates quantity of biomass produced in 
harvested forest. 
TOLAGLIVESTOCKMIXNAT Slop in mix constraint 
TRADECOST_STEP Variable for linearization of international trade. 
VAR_CALI_PRODUCTIONNE 
Variable for examination of land allocation deviation 
from that observe red. 
VAR_CALI_PRODUCTIONPO 
Variable for examination of land allocation deviation 
from that observe red. 
WELFARE_USFASOM Sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus of US. 
6. Basic Results and Sensitivity Analysis 
We present the model solutions and actual values of productions and acreages of the US 
and rest of the world, and US export of corn and soybean in table 2.9. In the base period, 
model solutions on US corn and soybean production, soybean production in rest of the 
world and crop acreages are close to observed. But corn production in rest of the world 
is 13% higher and solution on US export does not replicate the observed very well either. 
In the one period ahead simulation, corn production predict in rest of the world is very 
close to the actual average of 2005-2009 but on a smaller acreage base. The model under 
predicts US corn export, US soybean export and soybean production in rest of the world. 
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This implies that parameters of demand growth rates in the model are very possibly 
smaller than the actual ones.  
Table 2.9: Comparing Model Results with Actual  
 
Base Period 2000 
 
Simulation of 2010 
Solution on Region 
Model 
Prediction 
Actual 
Average 
of 1995-
2004 
Ratio of 
Prediction 
to Actual 
 
Model 
Prediction 
Actual 
Average 
of 2005-
2009 
Ratio of 
Prediction 
to Actual 
Corn 
production 
US (in 
Thousand 
Bushel) 
9489899 9530603 1.00 12878356 11976579 1.08 
Rest of the 
world (in 
Thousand 
Metric Tonne) 
409837 361591 1.13 469674 472186 0.99 
Corn 
Acreage 
US (in 
Thousand Acre) 
67209 71228 0.94 70126 78771 0.89 
Rest of the 
world (in 
Thousand 
Hectare) 
105020 110438 0.95 115728 125023 0.93 
Corn 
Export 
US (in 
Thousand 
Bushel) 
1521323 1883789 0.81 1376458 2044939 0.67 
Soybean 
Production 
US (in 
Thousand 
Bushel) 
2775940 2662032 1.04 2831626 3053641 0.93 
Rest of the 
world (in 
Thousand 
Metric Tonne) 
100695 97013 1.04 106437 149373 0.71 
Soybean 
Acreage 
US (in 
Thousand Acre) 
66072 70194 0.94 55338 72419 0.76 
Rest of the 
world (in 
Thousand 
Hectare) 
47667 46944 1.02 58051 66534 0.87 
Soybean 
Export 
US (in 
Thousand 
Bushel) 
1032833 940856 1.10 673600 1149688 0.59 
As a very preliminary test of the robustness of the model, we randomly draw a 
non-zero parameter at a time and impose positive and negative 1% shocks to the value of 
the parameter and re-solve the model. And we repeat this procedure for several times. 
Table 2.10 presents solutions of production, acreage and US export of corn and soybean 
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with shocks to five parameters relative to the base predictions. Overall, solutions on 
export are more sensitive to parameter shocks than production and acreage. Production 
and acreage of soybean are more volatile with the shocks than that of corn, and changes 
of the latter are within 1%. 
Table 2.10: Selected Solutions with Parameter Shocks Relative to the Base Predictions 
(Note: “ROW” stands for “rest of the world”) 
 
Ratio to Baseline Predictions 
Corn Soybean 
Acreage 
_ROW 
Acreage 
_US 
Export 
_US 
Production 
_ROW 
Production 
_US 
Acreage 
_ROW 
Acreage 
_US 
Export 
_US 
Production 
_ROW 
Production 
_US 
CROP
_DAT
A1 
Shock_
low 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
Shock_
up 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
CROP
BUD1 
Shock_
low 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
Shock_
up 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
CROP
BUD2 
Shock_
low 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
Shock_
up 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
PROC
BUD1 
Shock_
low 1.02 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
Shock_
up 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
PROC
BUD2 
Shock_
low 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
Shock_
up 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.00 
7. Limitations 
There are two major limitations in this model. First, due to the lack of data availability, 
the soybean-based commodities (raw soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil) are 
presented in a compromised way. This could have considerable impacts on the leakage 
assessment, as land use change in South America, in which a large part of arable land is 
located, is sensitive to changes in these markets. 
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Second, that demand growth parameters tend to be smaller than the actual 
exemplifies the uncertainties in our assessment. The leakage effect tends to be under-
estimated, provided that land with high productivity is converted sooner than lower ones. 
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CHAPTER III 
CROP YIELD GROWTH AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF US BIOENERGY AND CLIMATE 
POLICIES 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, society has been placing greater demands on the agricultural sector 
making it , in addition to its traditional food and fiber roles, also a source of bioenergy 
and a possible source of greenhouse gas mitigation(see IPCC (2007)). As a consequence, 
on the bioenergy side, US corn usage for ethanol has risen from 15.9 million tons (below 
5% of the total crop) to 104 million tons (almost 40%) between 2001 and 2010.
10
 The 
consequences of this demand expansion are multi-faceted. In the market, the bioenergy 
expansion coupled with other forces have caused crop prices to increase substantially 
(Trostle 2008, Abbott, Hurt and Tyner 2009), in turn causing food insecurity problems in 
developing countries (FAO 2008). Stimulated by higher prices, corn production in the 
US has expanded by 40% in the past decade both due to changes in the extensive margin 
(e.g., expansion of cropland via clearing of grassland, unprotected forest) and the 
intensive margin (e.g. using improved seeds to increase yield) (Melillo, et al. 2009) with 
11% more corn acreage. Beyond the market, such developments will inevitably have 
environmental consequences, notably increasing greenhouse gas emissions and chemical 
                                                 
10
 Data source: Earth Policy Institute (http://www.earth-policy.org/). 
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use/runoff plus erosion. In the realm of climate change mitigation, the price effects 
stimulate what is called the problem of leakage (Murray, et al. 2004) which happens 
when mitigation policies reduce net GHG emissions in one context but increase prices 
that in turn causes production expansion and associated emissions increases elsewhere. 
In addition to increased GHG emissions, there might be other environmental 
consequences on the local or regional scale, such as pollution to watersheds or loss of 
biodiversity, depending on the form of leakage. 
Baker et al. (2010) found that rising prices would have modestly positive welfare 
consequences in the US, as benefits to producers outweigh the loss to consumers. 
However, this may not be true if the scope is broadened from a US centric national 
agricultural sector, to a global analysis that also considers environmental damages. 
Additionally the price increases may cause substantial welfare losses for some people in 
the developing world. Assessments on the international scale are often found in reports 
of international organizations, such as the FAO.  
A global issue is the conceivably negative environmental consequences 
associated with the expansion of crop production, particularly in the form of leakage in 
the form of indirect land use change (ILUC). Searchinger, et al. (2008) argues that large 
carbon leakage causing an overall net emissions increase can arise through ILUC. 
However, there are some uncertainties clouding the magnitude of the consequences. 
EPA (2010) finds that the GHG implications are far lower than asserted by Searchinger.  
Also a number of studies suggest that alternative assumptions regarding values on key 
parameters (such as crop yield, bilateral trade responses), model assumptions (such as 
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geographical scope) and assumed leakage responses as to whether new lands come from 
forest or grasslands can lead to diverse estimations in policy assessments (Keeney and 
Hertel 2009, Schneider and McCarl 2006, EPA 2010). For example, Searchinger et al. 
(2008) argues that promoting use of bioenergy will lead to large amount of deforestation 
and associated carbon emissions that would not have happened without the policy 
creating an initial carbon debt and that the offset benefits can only be realized in the far 
future. In contrast, their finding is criticized for neglecting the price response of crop 
yield growth-- by using the low range of elasticity found in early literature, Keeney and 
Hertel (2009) indicates that 30% of the marginal ethanol demand in an initial 5 year term 
can be met by yield gains, which is 10% higher than the “best case” used in the 
Searchinger et al. (2008), implying the acreage expansion would be less than asserted by 
the latter. Fundamentally, these two studies differ in their assumptions regarding how 
supply, the product of acreage and yield, catches up with growing demand. As there is 
an ultimate limit on acreage, it is worth investigating the role of yield and prospects for 
yield growth.  
Recent discussions on reductions in crop yield growth are seen both in the 
economics literature (Alston, et al. 2009, Villavicencio 2010) and in other fields, such as 
biology (Arizen, et al. 2008). Studies of the crop yield growth have a variety of 
motivations, including whether climate or environmental change has exerted negative 
effects and whether changes in societal investment patterns have had an unfavorable 
result. Alston et al. (2009) investigates productivity growth of the agricultural sector 
instead of crop yield growth and finds that the productivity growth has slowed down in 
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the past two decades. Arizen et al. (2008) regresses crop yield growths on time with a 
linear function and concludes that there is no evidence that crop yield growths have 
slowed down. Whether this is happening is actually difficult to determine. In particular, 
such a trend in the data may be found not only because a slowdown in yield growth was 
occurring but also because of different measurement approaches (absolute growth vs. 
relative growth); time frames and functional form/estimation technique.  
If one is to estimate the determinants of crop yield using a production function 
result, then many independent variables would be included, notably climate conditions, 
soil type/characteristics, varieties and input use. If this were extended dynamically, then 
research and extension expenditures would be included.  In this chapter, rather than 
taking a production function approach, we examine the more aggregate characteristics of 
crop yield growth with time series techniques.  We will do this using US data.  
Specifically, we consider both exponential growth and linear growth possibilities in the 
crop yield growth trend with a possible change in the past 70 years. Subsequently we 
will use the results in the form of alternative yield growth scenarios up to the year 2030 
to investigate the international effects of U.S. bioenergy policies on market prices, 
exports, production, land use and welfare.  The study will utilize the global agricultural 
sectoral model discussed in the previous chapter.  
Uncertainty is inherent in leakage assessment, which is essentially the difference 
in predictions for the future land use under different policy scenarios. Assumptions on 
the values of crop yield growth rates are one of the key factors in these predictions. The 
contribution on this paper come in two regards: 1) a more reliable estimate on crop yield 
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growth rates is offered; and, 2) the relationship between environmental consequences of 
bioenergy/climate policies and crop yield is explicitly explored.  
2. Examination of Historical Crop Yield Growth Trend of US 
This study focuses on 8 major field crops at the national level in the US: corn, soybean, 
wheat, cotton, sorghum, oats, barley and hay. Their yield data for the years 1940-2009 
are collected from the Quick Stats data set developed by the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service of US Department of Agriculture.  The data are plotted in figure 3.1.  
Now we turn our attention to estimating the yield growth rate permitting 
potential changes in yield growth rates over time.  To do this we examine the historical 
yield growth rate in a two-step process: 1) we detrend the data to obtain residuals; 2) we 
examine the residuals to see if they are stationary
11
 and/or if they exhibit correlation 
across time.  
 
                                                 
11
 Time series data {Xt} is strictly stationary if (X1,...,Xn) and (X1+h,...Xn+h) have identical joint distribution 
for all integers h and n≥1. Time series analysis typically works with weaker assumption that says the two 
random vectors have the same first and second moments, i.e. their mean and covariance (Brockwell and 
Davis 2002). 
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Figure 3.1: National Average Yields Per Acre for 8 US Major Crops (1940-2009). 
Source: http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/Create_Federal_All.jsp. 
There are two ways of detrending the data: 1) a parametric way, such as finding 
the trend and/or seasonality function; and 2) a non-parametric way, such as differencing 
(the so-called Box-Jenkins method) until the resultant data is stationary (Brockwell and 
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Davis 2002). We follow the classical way to fit crop yield data with a time trend, which 
allows for greater flexibility in choosing time trend functions.
12
  
The regression functions we consider use yield and/or its logarithm as the 
dependent variable with a linear time-independent variable corresponding to linear and 
exponential growth processes respectively.
13
 In view of the concern of crop yield growth 
reducing over time, we also allow for a possible break in the trend function and consider 
all the possible combinations of the trend functions before and after the break, namely 
exponential trend followed by exponential trend, exponential trend followed by linear 
trend, linear trend followed by linear trend, and linear trend followed by exponential 
trend.  
The best fit trend function is determined by the method of hold-out validation.
14
 
The procedure will be presented in detail in Section 2.1. After the best yield growth rate 
function is found, correlation of residuals will be checked to see whether further 
modeling is needed. 
Following the time trend estimation, we then test whether the growth rate 
estimations of the two time segments are statistically different. The structural break test 
                                                 
12
 If the differencing procedure were used, it would impose implicit assumptions on the growth process. 
Differencing in original data implies an assumption of linear growth while differencing in logarithm of the 
original data assumes exponential growth. If the process grows in a mixed way, the derived data will not 
be stationary, which might jeopardize the following analysis. 
13
 For linear trend, yield=a+b*year, implying an ever decreasing growth rate, that is, 
      
2
2
a b * Year b GrowthRate b
GrowthRate 1  and 0
a b * Year 1 a b * Year 1 Year a b * Year 1
 
     
      
. For exponential trend, 
1 1a b *Yearyield e

  implying
 
1 1
1
1 1
a b *Year
b
a b * Year 1
e
GrowthRate 1 e 1
e

 
    , which is constant over time. 
We have also tried a quadratic time trend; however, our result indicates that the results are highly sensitive 
to the specific data set used-- even though it sometimes provides good estimates of the trend, it perform   s 
poor in validation. 
14
 http://research.cs.tamu.edu/prism/lectures/iss/iss_l13.pdf 
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employed here contains a large number of competing specific tests which can be 
classified fundamentally by whether the test assumes the break date is known or not. 
When the break date is assumed to be known, the classical Chow test can be applied.  
When the break date is assumed to be unknown, the tests typically have higher critical 
value leading to the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the estimated parameter 
values (or in other words, there is no structural break) being rejected less frequently 
(Hansen 2001). However, investigators typically have some a priori but not complete 
knowledge regarding the occurrence of the change and there is no clear cut answer to the 
question whether to assume the break date is known or unknown (Hansen 2001, 
Maddala and Kim 1998). In fact, research like ours is motivated by observations that 
technical progress has slowed down (e.g. Alston et al. (2009)) but we do not exactly 
know when the change occurred. Identification of the break point in our case will be data 
driven. Therefore, we will use both types of tests.  
2.1 Estimating Yield Growth Trends for US Crops 
Let us begin with corn, the most prevalent crop in US agriculture.  The left panel of 
figure 3.2 shows the average corn yield in the United States from 1940-2009, with a 
fitted linear model passed through it where y=a+b*year, with a=-3681 and b=1.91. The 
estimated slope on the year variable suggests the yield is growing at 1.91 bushels/year, 
equivalent to a 6.57% increase in 1940 but only 1.15% in 2009 where the yields in those 
periods average 28.9 bushels and 164.7 bushels respectively. 
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Figure 3.2: US Historical Corn Yield 1940-2009 with Fitted Linear Model 
After the regression, we need to determine whether there is additional 
information in the data. A way to do this is to test whether the autocorrelations of 
residuals are different than zero. Zero autocorrelations of residuals suggest it is very 
likely that the deterministic part of the data has been fully captured. Specifically, Ljung-
Box test is used, which is defined as 
2s
k
k 1
r
Q T(T 2 )
T k
  

.The null hypothesis of the 
test is that the data is random. Applying the test to the residuals of the linear regression 
of corn data, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
However, the residual plot of the fitted linear model (figure 3.2) shows some 
factors to take into consideration. Firstly, residuals of the model are spreading out 
showing that variance is increasing with time, which is no surprise since the average US 
yield has increased by around 3 fold over the whole period. More importantly, the 
standardized residual plot (the first panel on the right) does not seem to be random, 
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especially for the first three decades. Fitted values of the model tend to persistently 
underestimate the yield data for the first 10 years and overestimate the next 10. Then the 
residuals become and remain positive for another decade with only 1 or 2 exceptions. 
Since this pattern occurs only in a segment of the data and does not recur, the Ljung-Box 
test, when applied to the residual of the whole period, may not have the power to reject 
the null. This pattern suggests nonlinear yield growth. Careful examination of figure 3.2 
seems to indicate that the yield grew at a different rate up until about 1970 than it did 
after that. This can be seen better when the logarithm of corn yields are plotted against 
year (figure 3.3). 
15
 
 
 Figure 3.3: Logarithm of Corn Yield of US 1940-2009 
                                                 
15
 Another way to test for nonlinearity growth is to do a Box-Cox transformation on the yield, then regress 
the transformed data on time, namely, B(yt,λ)=a+bt+εt, where B(yt) denotes the Box-Cox transformation: 
t
t
t
y 1
, 0B( y , )
log( y ), 0

 

   
 
 (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). Here, Box-Cox transformation is used as a 
robustness check in the deciding whether the data can be adequately modeled with a simple linear or 
exponential model. 
In the case of corn, the estimation gives λ=0.7086 and both 0 and 1, which correspond to 
exponential growth and linear growth respectively, are outside of the 95%confidence interval of the 
estimated λ. This indicates that the data cannot be adequately modeled with either a simple linear model or 
a simple exponential model. Results on other crops will be discussed below at relevant point..  
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Consequently, we adopted an estimation procedure that fit two functions of 
potentially different forms (exponential and linear) with a break point where the 
estimation can change parameters. There are two parameters in the time trend function: 
the intercept and the slope. The models are called unrestricted when both coefficients are 
allowed to change-- these models will have the most freedom to fit data but are very 
likely to have jumps at the breakpoint between the two fitted regressions. The models in 
which the segments must connect at the breakpoint with each other are called restricted 
models. The restriction costs one degree of freedom in choosing parameters, i.e. only the 
slope coefficient can change freely. In other words, the restricted versus unrestricted 
refers to whether the absolute level of crop yield is allowed to change (as a result of a 
shock). To do this we fit eight models for alternative breakpoints and determine the best 
fit for a breakpoint where the functional forms switch (table 3.1).  
45 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Models with Breakpoint at Year i 
Model 1 
(Exponential + Linear-unrestricted) 
1 1
22
log( y ) a b * year,year 1940, ,i
y a b year,yea* r i 1, ,2009
   
      
Model 2 
(Exponential + Exponential-
unrestricted) 
1 1
22
log( y ) a b * year,year 1940, ,i
log( y ) a b year,year i 1, ,2009*
   
      
Model 3 
(Linear + Exponential-unrestricted) 
1 1
22
y a b * year,year 1940, ,i
log( y ) a b year,yea* r i 1, ,2009
   
      
Model 4 
(Linear + Linear-unrestricted) 
1 1
22
y a b * year,year 1940, ,i
y a b year,year i 1, ,2009*
   
      
Model 5 
(Exponential + Linear-restricted) exp
1 1
22
1 1 i 2 2 i
log( y ) a b * year,year 1940, ,i
y a b year,year i 1, ,2009
s.t. ( a b * ( t 1)) a b * ( t 1)
*
   
    
    
 
Model 6 
(Exponential + Exponential-restricted) exp
1 1
22
1 1 i 2 2 i
log( y ) a b * year,year 1940, ,i
log( y ) a b year,year i 1, ,2009
s.t. ( a b * ( t 1)) exp( a b * ( t 1)
*
)
   
    
    
 
Model 7 
(Linear + Exponential-restricted) 
1 1
22
1 1 i 2 2 i
y a b * year,year 1940, ,i
log( y ) a b year,year i 1, ,2009
s.t. a b * ( t 1) exp( a b * ( t
*
1))
   
    
    
  
Model 8 
(Linear + Linear-restricted) 
1 1
22
1 1 i 2 2 i
y a b * year,year 1940, ,i
y a b year,year i 1, ,2009
s.t. a b * ( t 1) a b * ( t 1)
*
   
    
    
  
These models imply that the trend function of the data changes once during the 
whole period at the break year i. No restrictions on whether the growth process is linear 
or exponential and whether the two segments connect are imposed a priori. Furthermore, 
in the estimation we search for the best break point (year) over the period [1959, 1988] 
(i.e. for i in the above equations), excluding the possibility that the change happens in 
the first or last 20 years. The break point is chosen at the point associated with the 
smallest mean squared error for the entire model. The estimated results are shown in 
table 3.2. 
Model 2 (Exponential+Exponential-unrestricted) is the best model in terms of 
mean squared error (MSE).
16
 Furthermore, the Ljung-Box test cannot reject the null 
                                                 
16
 We can potentially use other model selection criteria, such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). These criteria help the researcher to balance goodness-of-fit and 
parsimony of competing models. The difference in parameter number in our competing model is two at the 
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hypothesis of random residuals for both segments. This model implies that a break 
occurred at the year 1973 both to the growth rate and to the yield level. The best fit for 
the yield growth rate shows it fell from 3.67% before 1973 to 1.75% after, a fall of more 
than 50%. Such change implies the yield growth rate in more recent periods is 
approximately one half of what it was before 1973. Two other models are worth noting: 
Model 1 (Exponential+Linear-unrestricted) and Model 6 (Exponential+Exponential-
restricted) exhibit slightly larger MSE but give the same break point (Year 1973). 
Together, these three models suggest that the trend of corn yield growth of year 1940-
1973 is exponential, but that of year 1974-2009 is not as clear— fitted with either linear 
time trend or exponential time trend the residual can pass the Ljung-Box test. In view of 
this, we will proceed to the model validation with all three models. 
                                                                                                                                                
maximum and only one (if there is a structural break in the data). Furthermore, our best model is not 
determined solely by one criterion. Therefore, we use the simple criterion MSE only.   
  
 
 
4
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Table 3.2: Estimation of Models with Two Segments with Corn Data 
Model Estimation Result 
Break 
Year 
Ljung-Box 
Test  
(5% Confidence) 
Implied Growth Rate 
SSE/MSE Beginning of 
the Period 
End of the 
Period 
Simple Linear Model – 
a=-3681         b=1.91 -- Fail to Reject 6.57% 1.15% 
SSE=5185.20 
MSE=76.25 No break point 
Simple Exponential Model – 
a=-37.23        b=0.02 -- Reject  2.10% 2.10% 
SSE=7827.75 
MSE=115.114 No break point 
Model 1 a1=-70.51       b1=0.038 1973 
Fail to Reject 3.80% 3.80% SSE=4492.52 
MSE=68.07 (Exponential + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-3910.6     b2=2.02 Fail to Reject 2.28% 1.22% 
Model 2 a1=-67.03       b1=0.03627 1973 
Fail to Reject 3.67% 3.67% SSE=4423.33 
MSE=67.02 (Exponential  + Exp-unrestricted) a2=-29.86       b2=0.01736 Fail to Reject 1.75% 1.75% 
Model 3 a1=-2829.9     b1=1.47 
1964 
Reject 5.00% 2.33% SSE=4619.44 
MSE=69.99 (Linear + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-28.43       b2=0.017 Reject 1.70% 1.70% 
Model 4 a1=-3791        b1=1.96 1987 
Fail to Reject 6.78% 1.63% SSE=4630.25 
MSE=70.16 (Linear + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-5113.7     b2=2.62 Reject 3.00% 1.59% 
Model 5 a1=-70.28       b1=0.038 
1967 
Reject 3.80%  3.80%  SSE=4750.14 
MSE=70.90 (Exponential + Linear-restricted) a2=-3599        b2=1.86 Fail to Reject  2.33%   1.13% 
Model 6 a1=-71.64       b1=0.039 
1969 
Reject  3.90% 3.90% SSE=4510.35 
MSE=67.32 (Exp  + Exp-restricted) a2=-28.08       b2=0.016 Reject 1.60% 1.60% 
Model 7 a1=-3680.1     b1=1.91 1979 
Reject 7.50% 1.90% SSE=4994.98 
MSE=74.55 (Linear + Exponential-restricted) a2=-27.05       b2=0.01598 Reject 1.60% 1.60% 
Model 8 a1=-3080.6     b1=1.60 1959 
Reject 5.54%   3.01% SSE=5051.53 
MSE=75.40 (Linear + Linear-restricted) a2= -3823.07  b2=1.98 Fail to Reject 3.62%  1.20%  
Note: SSE stands for Sum of Squared Error. MSE stands for Mean Squared Error. And Year is the year when the data is separated. 
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To further compare the models, hold-out validation is used. That is, the previous 
steps are repeated twice with the last 5 and 10 observations excluded from the model 
estimation and used for prediction. Namely, the simple linear model, Model 1 
(Exponential+Linear-unrestricted), Model 2 (Exponential+Exponential-unrestricted) and 
Model 6 (Exponential+Exponential-restricted) will be estimated again with the data of 
1940–2004 and 1940–1999, and used to predict the yields of 2005–2009 and 2000–2009. 
The estimation results along with the prediction errors are reported in table 3.3. 
Although Model 2 (Exponential+Exponential-unrestricted) does not always have 
the smallest MSE, it is the best among the three in terms of giving the smallest out of 
sample prediction error. In fact, all except Model 2 under-predict all the yields of 2005–
2009 or 2000–2009 (figure 3.4). Furthermore, both the simple linear model and the 
unrestricted Exponential+Linear model (Model 1) have increasing estimations of the 
slope coefficient (in their linear parts) when more observations are added in, suggesting 
that the absolute annual growth in recent years are actually increasing which agrees with 
the exponential growth process to some extent. Therefore, Model 2 (the unrestricted 
Exponential+Exponential model) is determined to be the best model for the corn data. 
After detrending corn data with Model 2, the null hypothesis that the residuals are 
random cannot be rejected and there is no need to further model the residuals. 
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Table 3.3: Results of Hold-out Validation with Corn Data- Estimation and Prediction 
Model Estimation 
Result-0 
Estimation 
Result-5 
Out of sample 
Prediction 
Error-5 
Estimation 
Result-10 
Out of 
sample 
Prediction 
Error-10 
Simple Model- 
No break point 
y=a+b*year 
SSE=5185.20 
MSE=76.25 
a=-3681, 
b=1.91  
SSE=5033.63 
MSE=79.90 
a=-3629, b=1.88  
179.43 SSE=4622.88 
MSE=79.70 
a=-3588, 
b=1.86 
652.52 
Model 1 
(Exponential + 
Linear-
unrestricted) 
 
SSE=4492.52 
MSE=68.07 
Year=1973 
SSE=4380.98 
MSE=71.82 
Year=1973 
148.78 SSE=3969.15 
MSE=70.87 
Year=1973 
747.46 
a1=-70.51    
b1=0.038 
a1=-70.51    
b1=0.038 
a1=-70.51    
b1=0.038 
a2=-3910.55  
b2=2.02 
a2=-3746.17  
b2=1.94 
a2=-3521.62  
b2=1.82 
Model 2 
(Exponential + 
Exponential-
unrestricted) 
 
SSE=4423.33 
MSE=67.02 
Year=1973 
SSE=4372.19 
MSE=71.67 
Year=1973 
51.27 SSE=4021.97 
MSE=71.82 
Year=1973 
416.07 
a1=-67.03    
b1=0.036 
a1=-67.03    
b1=0.036 
a1=-67.03    
b1=0.036 
a2=-29.86  
b2=0.01736 
a2=-29.80 
b2=0.01736 
a2=-29.52 
b2=0.01722 
Model 6 
(Exponential + 
Exponential-
restricted) 
 
SSE=4510.35 
MSE=67.32 
Year=1969 
SSE=4456.07 
MSE=71.87 
Year=1969 
56.09 SSE=4093.48 
MSE=71.82 
Year=1969 
462.11 
a1=-71.64    
b1=0.039 
a1=-66.03    
b1=0.0357 
a1=-72.56    
b1=0.039 
a2=-28.08  
b2=0.016 
a2=-27.84 
 b2=0.016 
a2=-26.99 
b2=0.016 
Note: "-5" denotes 5 latest observations (2005–2009) removed from estimation. "-10" denotes 10 latest 
observations (2000–2009) removed from estimation. 
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Figure 3.4: Hold-out Validation with Corn Data- Prediction Period of 2000-2009 
In addition to corn, the same procedure is applied to data for seven other crops 
(soybean, wheat, cotton, sorghum, oats, barley and hay) to find out their yield growth 
trends. Estimation and validation results are presented in Appendix A.
17
 Summary of the 
results is presented in table 3.4. It is found that: 
                                                 
17
 If the yield data of these crops are transformed with Box-Cox transformation, then the optimal λ’s are 
found to be in the interval of [0,1] for soybean, cotton and barley; furthermore, for soybean, 0, 
corresponding to an exponential time trend, is within the 95% confidence interval and for cotton and 
barley, 1 , corresponding to a linear time trend, is within the 95% confidence interval. The optimal λ’s for 
wheat, sorghum, oats and hay are found to be greater 1. Although 1 is within the 95% confidence interval, 
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(1) Soybeans are the only crop that is well fitted without a break point; 
(2) Hay yield grows exponentially until 1982, after which yield growth is zero;  
(3) All other crops are best modeled by an Exponential + Exponential model 
implying that the best fit involves a break point.  
(4) After the break point, the growth rates are all found to be lower than the growth 
rate before that break by 50% or more. Among them, corn and cotton can be 
better modeled with the unrestricted model which suggests there was shift in the 
intercept (therefore absolute level of the yield) along with the growth rate; and 
(5) The break dates are different across crops. 
Table 3.4: Result Summary of Estimated Crop Yield Growth Rates  
 
No 
breakpoint 
Model 2 
Exponential+Exponential_unrestricted 
with breakpoint 
Model 6 
Exponential+Exponential_restricted 
with breakpoint 
Crop Soybeans Corn Cotton Wheat Sorghum Barley Oats Hay 
Yield 
Growth 
Rate 
Before 
breakpoint 
1.28% 3.67% 3.4% 2.3% 5% 2% 1.8% 1.6% 
Break Year  1973 1965 1972 1966 1979 1969 1984 
Yield 
Growth 
Rate after 
breakpoint 
 1.75% 1.5% 0.9% 0.5% 1.0% 0.65% 0.07% 
Finally we proceed to test randomness of the residuals from the above best fitted 
trend functions with a Ljung-Box test. For most of the crops, we find there is no 
additional information in the residuals. Wheat, sorghum and barley are the crops whose 
                                                                                                                                                
this indicates that the yields have been growing slower than linearly on average over the whole period and 
provides some indirect support for the suspicion of declining yield growth rates.  
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autocorrelations at lag 1 and 2 are statistically significantly different than zero. The non-
zero autocorrelation at lag 1 and 2 will be useful for one-step and two-step ahead 
forecasts (i.e. forecast for yield of the next two year in our context).
18
  This result will 
not be incorporated into our simulation model since it operates on a much longer 10 year 
time step. 
2.2 Testing for Structural Break in US Crop Yields Growth Trend 
In this section, we test whether the estimated crop yield growth rates before the break 
and after the break are statistically different. As explained in the beginning of this 
section, tests assuming both known and unknown break date will be used.  
2.2.1 Test with Known Break Date 
When the assumption is made that the break date is known, the Chow test
19
 for linear 
models can be applied to test for constancy of the parameter estimation.
20
 For the seven 
crops that were found to be better modeled with a break point, the null hypothesis of no 
                                                 
18
 When the autocorrelation (ACF) of a stationary time series (εt) is statistically significantly different than 
zero at lag j and the partial autocorrelation (PACF) of εt is not statistically significantly different than zero 
at all lags, it is recommended that εt  be modeled with MA(j), namely 
j
t i t i
i 0
a z 

  , where {zt} is white 
noise with mean 0 and variance 2  and  a0=1. Let P denote the prediction of εt, then  
     
j
t 1 t 1 i t 1 i
i 1
P P z a P z    

   , where  t 1P z 0   and  t t 1 jP z P( z )    can be calculated by observed data. 
And        t j 1 t j 1 1 t j j t 1P P z a P z a P z         , where t j 1 t 1P( z ) P( z ) 0        (Brockwell and 
Davis 2002). 
19
Chow test is a test of whether coefficients of different linear regression are equal. Suppose the data is 
{(x1, y1),...,(xT, yT)} and the break date is TB which separate the data into two sub-samples: {(x1, y1),...,(xTB, 
yTB)} and {(xTB+1, yTB+1),...,(xT, yT)}. To test whether the two sub-samples can be modeled by the same 
model, first run three regressions: 1) yt=a+b*xt, t=1,...,T; 2) yt=a1+b1xt, t=1,...,TB; and 3) yt=a2+b2xt, 
t=TB+1,...,T and let SSE0, SSE1 and SSE2 denote their sum of squared error respectively. Then the test is 
defined as 0 1 2
1 2
( RSS RSS RSS ) / 2
 
( RSS RSS ) / ( n 4 )
 
 
, and under the null hypothesis (a1=a2, b1=b2), the test follows F 
distribution with degree of freedom (2,n-4). 
20
 The application is facilitated by the fact that no mixed model (half exponential and half linear) appears 
among our best models. 
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structural change is uniformly rejected at the 1% significance level (table 3.5). On this 
basic we can conclude that that the yield growth changes are statistically different before 
and after the break or more to the point that yield growth in recent periods is slower than 
that in the more distant past. 
Table 3.5: Chow Test Result of Structural Change in Crop Yield 
Crop Assumed Break Year 
Test Value 
(F0.01(2,66)=4.942) 
Corn 1973 36.299 
Cotton 1965 23.716 
Wheat 1972 22.887 
Sorghum 1969 72.940 
Barley 1979 16.066 
Oats 1969 13.441 
Hay 1982 73.056 
2.2.2 Test with Unknown Break Date 
To test for a slowdown in crop yield growth when the break date is unknown, we use the 
procedure from Ben-David and Papell (1998), which was developed to test for 
slowdowns in postwar GDP growth. The testing procedure involves two steps: 1) test 
whether the time series possesses a unit-root, the result of which determines the use of 
different sets of critical value of the test for structural break; and 2) test for a structural 
break.  
Formally the Ben-David and Papell (1998) procedure is as follows: 
Let T denote the sample size and TB denote the breakpoint year. Then BT [ T , T ]  , 
where  T , T   denotes the interval of possible periods at which the change occurs. The 
parameters α and β are called the trimming parameters and we use the value of 0.25 and 
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0.75 to correspond the time period during which we search for break point in Section 2.1. 
Step 1 and 2 involve sequential regression of equations [3.1] and [3.2] respectively:  
k
t t t b t t 1 j t j t
j 1
y DU t DT D(T ) y C y , t [ T , T ]?         

           
  [3.1] 
k
t t t j t j t
j 1
y DU t DT C y t [ T, , T ]      

         [3.2] 
where in Ben-David and Papell (1998) yt is the logarithm of GDP per capita and will be 
replaced with the yield or its log in this study, tDU 1 , if t>TB, 0 otherwise, 
t BDT t T   if t>TB, 0 otherwise and b tD(T ) 1  if t=TB+1, 0 otherwise.  
Essentially,     and     allow a post break shift in the intercept and the slope in 
the regression which are captured by (θ-γ*TB) and γ respectively. In other words, if there 
is no structural break, then θ and γ would be zero. k, the number of lags, is determined 
with a data dependent method—start with an upper bound kmax of k; if the last lag 
included in the regression is significant, then use k= kmax otherwise reduce k by 1. In this 
study, kmax is set at 5. 
For the Step 1 unit root test, let t-stat denote the minimum of the t-statistics on ρ 
over all possible trend breaks. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the data follows a unit 
root process and the alternative (H1) is the data is stationary. Then according to Perron 
(1994) H0 will be rejected if t-stat is less than critical value at the given significance level. 
For the Step 2 structural break test, let SupFt denote the maximum, over all 
possible trend breaks, of two times the standard F-statistics for testing θ=γ=0. The null 
hypothesis (H0) is that there is no structural break in the data and the alternative (H1) is 
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there exists a break. Then according to Vogelsang(1997)  H0 is rejected if SupFt is larger 
critical value at given significance level. And B t
arg
T SupF
t

 
gives the estimation of the 
break date.  
Table 3.6 presents the results of the tests assuming the break date is unknown. 
Columns 2 through 5 correspond to the test statistics results of the two steps and 
acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis. Column 6 through Column 10 give 
numbers resulted from the 2
nd
 step regression. Specifically, Column 6, Column 9 and 
Column 10 are the break year, the growth rates before the break and changes in the 
growth rates during the break given by the test regression.
21
 The results agree with the 
Chow-test result. All the crops in our study, except soybeans, exhibit a break point in 
their yield growth and again we find a statistically significant slow-down in growth rates.  
Table 3.6: Test with Unknown Break Date Result of Structural Change in Crop Yield 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Crop 
Stage1 
t-stat 
Unit Root 
Stage2 
SupFt 
Break Year of SupFt
 
Initial 
Intercept 
μ 
Intercept 
Shift 
θ- γ*TB 
Initial Slope 
τ 
Slope 
Shift 
γ 
Soybean -8.20 No 5.90 No -- -- -- -- -- 
Corn -9.51 No 73.45 Yes 1972 -80.65 51.172 0.043 -0.026 
Cotton -6.79 No 38.13 Yes 1965 -83.40 60.635 0.046 -0.031 
Wheat -6.29 No 21.76 Yes 1968 -77.54 51.278 0.042 -0.026 
Sorghum -6.75 No 27.16 Yes 1966 -102.71 96.249 0.054 -0.049 
Barley -5.54 No 15.72 Yes 1982 -58.34 31.632 0.032 -0.016 
Oats -7.74 No 37.66 Yes 1971 -44.49 33.407 0.025 -0.017 
Hay -6.32 No 20.94 Yes 1982 -22.67 21.772 0.012 -0.011 
                                                 
21
 The estimation results can roughly be interpreted in this way. To obtain the annual growth rates, the 
estimated slopes need to be adjusted by the parameters on the lags. Also the test is developed mainly for 
testing of structural break, and there are other specific regressions developed for estimating the break date.  
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2.3 Conservative Estimation of the Yield Growth Rates 
We also derive a conservative estimate of the crop yield growth rate for use in our 
analysis, i.e. based on trends in the historical data, a growth rate that can be reached with 
probability of 0.9. With the break point identified, the time trend function for the period 
1940-2009 can be written in the following ways: 
t 1 2 1 T 1 T 2 Ty a ( a a )D b (1 D )t b D t       [3.3] 
t 1 1 T 0 T 2 0 Ty a b [ D T t(1 D )] b ( t T )D       [3.4] 
Equations [3.3] and [3.4] are for the unrestricted and restricted models 
respectively. yt is the logarithm of crop yields. T0 is the break year and DT=0 if t≤T0 and 
DT=1 if t>T0. b1 and b2 are the annual increase in the logarithm of yield for the first 
period and second period respectively. By estimating equations [3.3] and [3.4], we 
obtain the estimated standard error of b2 ˆ . Then, based on the delta method, the 
conservative estimation of crop yield growth rate is  
 
 bˆ
b2
2
2 2 2
0.9
e 1
ConservativeGrowthRate e 1 Z (ˆ )
b

 
  

 [3.5] 
In equation 3.5, Z0.9 is the one-tailed critical value at a 90% confidence level for 
the standard normal distribution. Estimates of other confidence levels can be calculated 
by simply replacing the critical value at the corresponding confidence level. We present 
the “Best Guess” of the crop yield growth rates, which are our estimations in previous 
sections, and the growth rate estimates at “90% Confidence” and “95% Confidence” in 
table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7: Conservative Estimation of Crop Yield Growth Rate for the Post-2009 Period 
 
Soybeans Corn Cotton Wheat Sorghum Barley Oats Hay 
Best Guess 1.28% 1.75% 1.47% 0.90% 0.50% 0.90% 0.65% 0.00% 
90% 
Confidence 
1.22% 1.54% 1.32% 0.80% 0.34% 0.80% 0.50% 0.00% 
95% 
Confidence 
1.20% 1.48% 1.28% 0.77% 0.29% 0.77% 0.46% 0.00% 
3. Exploration of the Implications of Slowdown in Yield 
The importance of technological progress can be shown with a simple graphic analysis 
(figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.5: Graphic Analysis of Commodity and Land Market 
In figure 3.5, the upper panel represents the commodity market and the lower 
panel represents the land market. The land market representation is adopted from 
(Mendelsohn and Dinar 2009). Bioenergy policy constitutes a positive demand shock 
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while climate mitigation policy constitutes a negative supply shock in the commodity 
market. To make the graphical analysis clear, we use a positive demand shock (D2). D1 
represents the pre demand shock crop demand; total demand TD after the shock is the 
horizontal sum of D1 and D2. The market equilibrium is E1 without D2. Adding in D2 
without increasing supply moves the market equilibrium to E2. Price increases from P0 
to P2, the quantity devoted to the pre shock demand decreases by AE1. In the land 
market (lower panel), the demand shock would cause farmland acreage to increase from 
OR to OT. If at the same time there is an increase in supply shifting S1 outwards to S2 to 
counteract the demand increase, with the result that the raise in market price and 
reduction in traditional demand would be less by P1P2 and AB and development of new 
land by for example conversion of forest land is reduced by UT. It is possible for the 
final equilibrium B and U in both markets to be on the left of the original point E1 
(opposite to A and T) and R if the shift in supply is large enough; however, the shift 
required to make BE1 to be zero is very likely to be different than that required to make 
UT to be zero.  
Viewing the process in a dynamic way, then S1 represents supply under current 
technological in each period and S2 represents the supply with higher yield growth rate 
induced by technology progress. The distance between S1 and S2 will increase over time; 
or in other words, S2 is moving away from S1. However, how fast and how far S2 
moves in the real world cannot be determined in this highly abstract graphical model. 
We now proceed to quantity these effects with a global agricultural simulation model. 
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3.1 Introduction of the Simulation Model 
The global agricultural simulation model is the integration of the US FASOM (Forest 
and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model) and GLOBIOM (Global Biomass 
Optimization Model). The integrated model is a recursive dynamic, nonlinear 
programming model of the global forest and agricultural sector. It simulates the 
allocation of land over time to competing activities in both the forest and agricultural 
sectors and the resultant consequences for the commodity markets supplied by these 
lands. It is a bottom-up global model, being able to take into account not only the 
economic aspects, but also the biophysical aspects of the sector and therefore lending 
itself to policy analysis of international environmental issues. More detailed description 
can be found in Chapter 2. 
3.2 Scenario Setup 
We use the projections from the Annual Energy Outlook 2009 (AEO) by US Energy 
Information Administration as our baseline and the Renewable Fuel Standard as our 
reference policy scenario. The major difference between AEO 2009 and RFS is that the 
projected level of US conventional ethanol production/consumption is 2 billion gallons 
less each year in the AEO projection. Our simulation period is from 2000 to 2030. We 
will simulate using the four technical progress scenarios developed above and see what 
effect they have on the global sector with and without the US RFS in place (table 3.8).
22
 
The differences of crop yield growth rates across scenarios are substantial: crop yield 
                                                 
22
 Crop yield growth rates estimated in Section 2 are used for the US, for rest of the world, crop yield rates 
are set at 0.5% per year. 
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growth rates in Low Tech are 0.1%~0.2% lower than those under the Current Tech most 
of which are less than 50% of those in Hi Tech except for soybeans.  
Table 3.8: Simulation Scenarios 
 Policy Scenario 
Technical Progress Scenarios
23
 Baseline (AEO) RFS 
Low Tech: Crop yields grow at conservative 
rates, estimates with 90% confidence 
AEO.LOW RFS.LOW 
Current Tech: Crop yields grow at current rates AEO.BASE RFS.BASE 
Hicorn Tech
24
:
 
Corn yield grows at historical high 
rate and other crops grow at current rates 
AEO.HICORN RFS.HICORN 
Hi Tech: All crop yields grow at historical high 
rates 
AEO.HI RFS.HI 
3.3 Simulation Results 
3.3.1 Effect on Domestic Production, Price and Welfare 
We begin with presenting the breakdown in corn usage (table 3.9). In the Low Tech and 
Current Tech scenarios, the implementation of RFS causes corn for traditional use to 
shift away toward ethanol-- corn quantities for domestic demand, feed mix use and 
                                                 
23
 In our estimation, the logarithms of crop yield data are regressed on year, namely log(yt)=a+bt+εt, in 
which b can be interpreted as the crop yield growth rate. It follows that the expectation of logarithem of 
crop yield is E(log(yt))=a+bt and the expectation of crop yield is 
2
a bt
2
tE( y ) e

 
 , where σ
2
 is the variance 
of the error term. The term 
2
2e

is neglected in our calculation of crop yield forecasts. Since the estimated 
σ2 is in the order of 10-2, our ignorance will result in a difference less than 1%.      
24
 This scenario is included because the sources of R&D investments in developing better seeds are 
different among the crops. Development of corn seeds receives a lot of investment in the private sector, 
followed by soybeans and cotton. But that of wheat and other smaller crops rely on researches in public 
institutions (Fernandez-Cornejo 2009). Because public research is generally less sensitive to price and also 
it is found that public investment in agricultural investment is slowing down in existing literature (Alston 
et al. 2009), it is very likely that technology progress occurs to only some of the crops we examined in 
previous section.   
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export decrease and that for process use (which includes making ethanol) increases. In 
the Hicorn Tech and Hi Tech scenarios, corn quantities for all usages are higher even 
with the implementation of RFS policy.  
Table 3.9: Difference in Categories of Corn Demand in US Relative to Scenario 
AEO.BASE in Million Bushels 
 
Export Domestic Demand Feed Mix Use Process Use 
2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
RFS. 
LOW 
-39.8 -95.1 -467.3 -15.5 -23.7 -15.3 -267.1 -319.0 -80.4 670.4 905.6 534.1 
RFS. 
BASE 
-12.7 -19.9 -297.8 -15.5 -15.8 0.0 -173.5 -19.7 78.5 670.7 922.2 546.3 
RFS. 
HICO
RN 
170.0 771.3 550.9 38.8 86.7 68.7 699.3 1276.2 924.9 734.3 1006.1 631.7 
RFS. 
HI 
170.0 1274.0 1579.4 38.8 86.7 68.7 547.7 1124.0 631.8 734.3 1002.1 610.4 
With the exception of soybean, the implementation of RFS policy also causes 
decreases in productions of other crops for the period 2010 under the Low Tech and 
Current Tech scenarios due to acreage substitution and lower prices (upper panel of 
figure 3.6). In the medium term, namely at the end of our simulation period the effect of 
the RFS policy on crop productions is much smaller than the effect of technology 
progress (lower panel of figure 3.6). Regardless of the policy scenario, under the Low 
Tech scenario and Current Tech scenario the quantities of corn and soybeans increase by 
around 80% and 40% respectively for the simulation period 2030. In the Hicorn Tech 
scenario and Hi Tech scenario, corn production doubles at the end of the simulation 
period. Soybean production increases by 20% in the Hicorn Tech scenario, which is the 
smallest among all the technology scenarios. Production of other crops also experience 
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less increase or even decrease in the Hicorn Tech scenario. This may be due to the fact 
that profitability of corn is better due to higher technological progress, and therefore 
other crops are crowded out. The Hi Tech scenario is the only scenario that productions 
of all crops show positive increase.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Percentage of Production Increase Relative to 2000 of All Crops 
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The Fisher index of US domestic prices of the eight crops are presented in table 
3.10. Under the AEO.LOW and AEO.BASE scenario, the values of the index are larger 
than one for the whole simulation period, reflecting that the supply and demand balances 
are tight during the simulation period without the RFS policy. The presence of the RFS 
policy causes more price increases. In the Hicorn Tech scenario, prices return to the 
2000 level at period 2020 but increase by 10% at period 2030. This may be caused by 
the prevailing limited increase/ reduction in productions of crops other than corn. Only 
in the Hi Tech scenario, prices show decreasing trend. 
Table 3.10: Fisher Index of US Domestic Prices of the Eight Crops 
 
2000 2010 2020 2030 
AEO.LOW 1 1.18 1.12 1.07 
AEO.BASE 1 1.17 1.10 1.07 
AEO.HICORN 1 1.07 1.02 1.13 
AEO.HI 1 0.99 0.83 0.76 
RFS.LOW 1 1.22 1.16 1.07 
RFS.BASE 1 1.20 1.13 1.06 
RFS.HICORN 1 1.08 1.01 1.12 
RFS.HI 1 1.00 0.82 0.76 
Total domestic welfare is higher with the presence of the RFS policy and also 
increases with higher yield growth rates. Furthermore, although decomposing the change 
of welfare to technology progress and policy depends on the route of the decomposition, 
it is robust that the impact of the RFS policy is larger than that of change in crop yield 
growth rates (table 3.11). 
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Table 3.11: Decomposing Total US Agricultural Sector Welfare (In Billion US Dollars) 
 Initial 
Scenario 
Difference between Initial 
Scenario and Medium 
Scenario  
Medium 
Scenario 
Difference between 
Medium Scenario and 
End Scenario End Scenario 
2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
AEO.BASE 
-0.6 -1.3 -1.2 AEO.LOW 1.7 14.0 15.0 
RFS.LOW 
1.6 13.3 15.0 RFS.BASE -0.6 -1.4 -1.2 
3.6 4.1 2.8 AEO.HICORN 0.6 14.3 15.0 
RFS.HICORN 
1.6 13.3 15.0 RFS.BASE 3.4 5.1 2.5 
6.0 11.1 13.2 AEO.HI 1.7 14.7 16.0 
RFS.HI 
1.6 13.3 15.0 RFS.BASE 6.0 12.6 14.1 
Consumers generally lose with the presence of the RFS policy but gain with 
increases in crop yields. All regions but Western_US gain increase in surplus with the 
implementation of the RFS policy. Technology progress tends to cause losses to 
producers. Under the Hi Tech scenario, 3 out of 5 regions (Western_US, Southern_US 
and Midwest) will incur surplus loss. But some of these losses can be outweighed by the 
gains brought by the RFS policy. For example, Midwest would gain 12549.6 million US 
dollars with the implementation of RFS, and if crop yield growth rates were resumed to 
the Hi Tech scenario level, the surplus gain would reduce by 4575.5 million US dollars--
net effect of the policy and technology progress remains positive (table 3.12).  
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Table 3.12: Decomposing Regional US Agricultural Sector Producer Surplus (In Million 
US Dollars) 
 
LOW BASE HICORN HI 
Difference 
between 
RFS. 
BASE and 
AEO. 
BASE 
Difference 
between 
different 
technology 
progress and 
BASE with 
RFS 
Difference 
between 
RFS. 
BASE and 
AEO. 
BASE 
Difference 
between 
different 
technology 
progress and 
BASE with 
RFS 
Difference 
between 
RFS. 
BASE and 
AEO. 
BASE 
Difference 
between 
different 
technology 
progress and 
BASE with 
RFS 
Difference 
between RFS. 
BASE and 
AEO. 
BASE 
Difference 
between 
different 
technology 
progress and 
BASE with 
RFS 
WESTERN
_US 
-1590.3 52.4 -1590.3 -- -1590.3 6472.8 -1590.3 -1454.2 
PLAINS 17697.4 828.5 17697.4 -- 17697.4 7006.6 17697.4 345.2 
SOUTHER
N_US 
1376.2 -595.0 1376.2 -- 1376.2 2293.7 1376.2 -5159.8 
MIDWEST 12549.6 339.7 12549.6 -- 12549.6 -7090.7 12549.6 -4575.5 
NRTHEAS
T 
32.7 92.2 32.7 -- 32.7 -73.1 32.7 696.8 
3.3.2 International Leakage Effect 
The aggregate impact of the RFS policy and technology progress in US on the total 
welfare of rest of the world is quite small. We will briefly discuss the impacts on 
production and then turn our attention to the leakage effect. 
World demand is growing all the time. If crop yield growth rates in the US 
decrease (increase), prices would rise and this would stimulate increases (decreases) in 
production in the rest of the world. The model results show this. Under the Hi Tech 
scenario, production of corn, wheat and sorghum increase in the US causing prices to 
drop and in turn production in the rest of the world decreases. Production of corn in the 
rest of the world is the lowest in the Hicorn Tech scenario and that of other crops are the 
same as in the Current Tech scenario. Soybeans production is higher in the Hi Tech 
scenario and the Hicorn Tech scenario than that in the Current Tech scenario.  
Table 3.13 shows the differences in land use change among some of the 
scenarios. Under the Current Tech scenario, the implementation of RFS policy in the US 
66 
 
 
 
would cause increases in the acreage of agricultural land (cropland, grassland or short 
rotation coppice (SRP) production) over the whole simulation period, total at 1.16 
million hectares. This land is converted from 0.25 million hectares of deforestation and 
0.91 million hectares of natural land. Furthermore, a 0.1%-0.2% reduction in crop yields 
(i.e. moving from Current Tech scenario to Low Tech scenario) would cause additional 
of land converted for agricultural use increase to 1.81 million hectares, which is a more 
than 50% of increase. If all crop yield growth rates were resumed to historical high level, 
agricultural land use increases reduce by 0.66 and 2.83 million hectares in 2010 and 
2020. Agricultural land use sees a large increase in the period of 2030. Together, a 
smaller but positive leakage effect-- a total of 0.16 million hectares less of land 
conversion—is resulted over the whole simulation period. The Hicorn scenario shows a 
similar story and the leakage effect is even smaller (0.30 million hectares) over the 
whole simulation period.
  
 
 
6
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Table 3.13: Comparative Levels of International Land Use Change (Million Hectares) 
Scenarios 
compared  
1 2 3 
 
4 5 
 
6 
 
Cropland Grassland SRP 
Subtotal 
of 1, 2, 
and 3 
Primary 
Forest 
Managed 
Forest 
Subtotal 
of 4 and 
5 
Natural 
Land 
Subtotal 
of 4, 5, 
and 6 
RFS.BASE 
less 
AEO.BASE 
2010 0.67 -0.03 -0.01 0.63 -0.26 -0.03 -0.29 -0.34 -0.63 
2020 0.45 0.03 0.02 0.51 0.34 -0.01 0.32 -0.83 -0.51 
2030 -0.27 0.16 0.13 0.02 -0.33 0.04 -0.29 0.27 -0.02 
Cumulative 0.85 0.16 0.14 1.16 -0.25 0.00 -0.25 -0.91 -1.16 
RFS.LOW 
less 
AEO.BASE 
2010 0.83 -0.06 -0.01 0.76 -0.44 -0.03 -0.47 -0.29 -0.77 
2020 0.97 0.06 0.05 1.08 0.39 -0.18 0.21 -1.30 -1.09 
2030 -0.27 0.27 -0.03 -0.03 -0.21 -0.06 -0.27 0.30 0.03 
Cumulative 1.53 0.27 0.01 1.81 -0.26 -0.27 -0.53 -1.29 -1.82 
RFS.HICORN 
less 
AEO.BASE 
2010 -0.23 -0.05 0.01 -0.27 0.56 0.00 0.56 -0.29 0.27 
2020 -1.69 -0.20 -0.12 -2.01 0.92 1.31 2.23 -0.23 2.00 
2030 1.97 0.76 -0.15 2.48 -0.58 0.47 -0.11 -2.47 -2.58 
Cumulative 0.05 0.51 -0.26 0.30 0.89 1.78 2.67 -2.98 -0.31 
RFS.HI less 
AEO.BASE 
2010 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 1.10 0.00 1.10 -1.08 0.02 
2020 -1.93 -0.19 -0.10 -2.82 1.20 1.54 2.74 -0.52 2.22 
2030 2.78 0.51 -0.05 3.84 -1.27 0.43 -0.78 -2.41 -3.19 
Cumulative 0.86 0.30 -0.16 1.00 1.03 1.97 3.00 -4.01 -1.01 
Note: Land can be converted in and out of Category 1, 2, 3. No land can be converted into Category 4 and 6. No land can be 
converted out of Category 5. Therefore, positive (negative) denotes more (less) land converted into one category or less (more) 
land converted out of one category depending on the specific category.   
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The reduction of leakage effect with higher crop yield growth rates happens only 
at the highly aggregate level. Although avoided deforestation is larger in scenarios with 
higher crop yield growth rates, the conversion of natural land is also higher. Furthermore, 
some specific regions could have increase in forest clearance in scenarios with higher 
crop yield growths (figure 3.7). 
Under the Current Tech scenario, the implementation of the RFS causes an 
addition of 322 million metric of GHG emissions associated with land use change. This 
estimation is quite close to the estimate by Mosnier et al. (2012), which uses the 
GLOBIOM model alone. In that paper, estimates are further normalized based on 
simulation period and production and energy contents of the bioenergy and then 
compared to other studies.
25
 However, it is not very clear whether the results across the 
studies are directly comparable as the normalization procedure is not explicitly presented 
in most of these studies. Small reductions in crop yield growth rates lead to an 80% 
increase in emissions. Our result shows that the Hicorn scenario in which corn is the 
only crop whose growth rate was resumed to its higher historical level is preferable in 
terms of GHG emissions. Avoided GHG emissions in RFS.HICORN scenario is larger 
than that in the RFS.HI scenario and RFS.HICORN is the only technology scenario 
under which cumulative GHG emissions over the whole simulation period is smaller 
than that in the AEO.BASE scenario (table 3.14).  
                                                 
25
 In most studies, the leakage effect in terms of  GHG emission is presented in grams/MJ (or grams/BTU), 
in which MJ and BTU stand for mega joule and British thermal unit respectively. These numbers are 
obtained through normalizing the total emission in the following way: 
TotalEmission
DifferenceIn Pr oductionOfBioeneryBetweenBaseAndPolicyScenarios* EnergyContentOfBioenergy
.In some studies, the number would 
be further annualized. Therefore, the results are determined not only by the simulations, but also by the 
post-simulation report calculation procedures, which are very likely to differ across studies. 
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Figure 3.7: Difference in Avoided Deforestation Relative to Scenario RFS.BASE (For Regions with More Than 0.1 Million 
Hectares Difference) 
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Table 3.14: Difference in GHG Emissions Associated with Land Use Change (Million 
Metric Tonne) 
 
RFS.BASE less 
AEO.BASE 
RFS.LOW less 
RFS.BASE 
RFS.HICORN less 
RFS.BASE 
RFS.HI less 
RFS.BASE 
2010 36.09 -28.63 -186.31 -201.49 
2020 84.80 -32.75 -247.39 -79.46 
2030 201.93 320.94 -741.22 22.89 
Cumulative 322.82 259.56 -1174.92 -258.06 
4. Conclusion and Limitations 
This paper has examined the yield growth trend of 8 major US crops and found that all 
but soybeans has experienced slowdown during the period of late 1960s to early 1980s. 
In particular corn has fallen from 3.67% to 1.75%.  The reductions in crop yield growth 
rates are tested to be statistically significant.  
We use the estimation results to investigate the international effect of the US 
bioenergy policy (the Reusable Fuel Standard) under alternative yield scenarios. The 
policy has been subject to criticism as it competes with traditional demand and 
contributes to price rises and can stimulate undesirable environmental consequences, 
notably land use changes. We have found that if US crop yields grow at the current rate, 
the supply-demand balance would be tight even without the bioenergy policy as the price 
index remains larger than one for the whole simulation period. And the implementation 
of the policy will cause price to further increase.  
If US crop yields grow at the current rate, the implementation of RFS has strong 
impacts in the short-run-- corn for all uses but processing reduces and corn production 
crowds out productions of other crops. In the medium term, the impacts of the RFS 
policy on production are much smaller than that of technology progress. 
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Total welfare increases with the implementation of the RFS policy and also with 
higher technology progress. Decomposition of the total welfare shows that a larger part 
of the increase should be ascribed to the policy implementation. Producers generally 
gain with the policy implementation and lose with higher crop yield growth rates. The 
net effect of policy and technology progress is uncertain for individual regions.  
The implications on land use change are more complicated. Our model shows 
that if US crop grows at the current rate, the implementation of RFS policy would cause 
an addition of 1.16 million hectares of agricultural land expansion in rest of the world, 
which comes from deforestation and loss of natural land. And slowing in crop yield 
growth rates leads to large increases in clearance of forest and natural land. The net land 
use change from forest/natural land to agricultural land in rest of the world would be 
smaller but remain positive if US crop yield growth were resumed to the historical high 
level. Furthermore, specific regions could incur increase of forest/natural land clearance 
in scenarios with higher crop yields. The different spatial distributions of land use 
change make it difficult to calculate the environmental benefits of higher crop yield 
growth rates, especially when local benefits of these land types are considered. 
Associated with land use change, GHG emissions is smaller in scenarios with 
higher crop yield growth rates. Specifically, our model shows that the leakage effect in 
terms of GHG emission is negative in the Hicorn scenario in which only corn yield 
growth rate was resumed to its higher historical level. However, this result may be 
sensitive to the simulation period choice as we see large increases in both prices and 
acreage of agricultural land at the end of our simulation period. 
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There are several limitations to this analysis that we should point out.  First, our 
results on GHG emission cannot be viewed as a complete emission assessment of the 
bioenergy policy. Within the agricultural sector, our calculation focuses on those related 
to land use change and does not take emissions related to fertilizer into account. 
Fertilizer-related emissions would differ across scenarios for two reasons: firstly, level 
of fertilizer use is a part of management decision to be endogenously determined at each 
solve of the model; and, secondly, since positive input elasticities ε are specified in the 
integrated FG model, meaning that 1 % in yield increase implies ε% of increase in 
fertilizer use (and the rest of (1- ε)% is due to pure technological progress), fertilizer use 
would vary across different technological progress scenarios. Moreover, simulation 
results are subject to limitations in the modeling exercise discussed in Chapter II so are 
better thought of as qualitative estimates of the likely magnitude and direction of trends, 
than of quantitative predictions of the actual values of those trends.  
The most important conclusion is that with higher technological progress, it 
would be possible for the agricultural sector to meet the new demands stemming from 
the need of climate change mitigation and the traditional demands simultaneously. 
However, whether this can be achieved depends on not only the rates of technological 
progress (namely crop yield growth rates in this study) but also the mix of technological 
progress of different crops.      
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CHAPTER IV 
DESIGNING POLICIES TO ADDRESS ADDITIONALITY 
1. Introduction and Literature Review 
Because of the positive externality of environmental services, they are often under-
produced. One way to correct for it is for governments to pay for the environmental 
services provided. Farmers in the US have been paid to adopt practices that generate 
environmental services through programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP), which started in 1985. In recent years, international conservation agencies and 
developed countries have increasingly turned to incentive-based approaches, especially 
direct payments for environmental service, to replace the method that nests stimulation 
of environmental good production in development supporting, for example the 
Integrated Conservation and Development programs (Ferraro and Kiss 2002). The 
popularity of direct payment programs arises in the background of which agencies are 
facing tightening budgets and pursue more efficient use of limited financial resources 
(Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Wunder 2005).  
It is very difficult to measure the benefits of these programs precisely for reasons 
such as uncertainty or the existence of intangibles. What can be said with certainty, 
however, is that if a payment does not generate any benefits, it fails the most basic test of 
economic efficiency.  It turns out that all environmental programs must address this 
critical question: are the payments bringing about positive changes; i.e., is there 
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sufficient additionality? Additionality is satisfied if payments are made for services that 
would not have occurred without the payment. 
The issue of climate change mitigation is one area where additionality has 
received a lot of attention in recent years. It has been estimated that there could be low 
cost mitigation opportunities (in the form of emission reductions and carbon 
sequestration) in the agricultural and forestry sectors (Manley, et al. 2005, McCarl and 
Schneider 2001, Sohngen, et al. 2008). Cap-and-trade schemes have been popular in the 
international community for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. However, as the 
agricultural and forestry sector is not very likely to be covered by a cap (with some 
possible exceptions), these low cost opportunities are likely to be included in the carbon 
market as offsets. The idea of offsets is that a capped emission source can neutralize its 
own emission by paying for emission reductions in regions or sectors that are not under 
the cap.
26
 However, if the offsets generated are non-additional, i.e. they would have 
happened even without the payment, then the crediting and sale of these offsets would 
not reduce emissions relative to the status quo and the trade would result in increase in 
GHG emissions.  
The non-additionality problem stems from asymmetric information between 
those who credit and pay for the environmental service and those who provide it. To 
completely avoid making payment to the non-additional environmental service produced, 
                                                 
26
 For example, under the Kyoto Protocol, offsets are allowed through the mechanisms of Joint 
Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
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buyers need to know the specific baseline of every producer,
27
 but individual baselines 
are more likely to be private information of the producers.
28
 The information advantage 
of the service producers enables them to gain some rents by selling the non-additional 
environmental service. While from the standpoint of the buyer, it would be more costly 
for her to attain any given amount of additional environmental service.  
A policy design that regulators frequently use to avoid paying for the non-
additional production is the baseline method. This method refers to a policy design in 
which the regulator sets a baseline and pays every producer for production above the 
baseline.
29
 By doing so, the regulator will not be able to weed out all the non-additional 
service unless the announced baseline is set at the maximum baseline of the whole group 
of producers who participate. At the same time, she potentially penalizes some producers 
who have a low baseline, so that some low cost production is excluded. The baseline 
method has been studied in both empirical (Ghosh et al. 2011) and theoretical studies 
(Horowitz and Just 2011). Ghosh et al. (2011) uses a simulation model with real data and 
shows credit supply decreases with tightening baseline in the water quality trading 
program of the Conestoga watershed. Horowitz and Just (2011) examines the 
determination of an optimal baseline in the context of carbon cap-and-trade scheme 
where the baseline is applied to a source uncovered by the cap and in turn this source 
                                                 
27
 That is, buyers need to know not only the distribution of the baselines, but the individual realizations of 
baselines for each offset producer. The distribution itself may be difficult to anticipate, but the 
implications of unknown baseline distribution are beyond of the scope of this paper. 
28
 We will use the term “producer” to exclusively refer to a non-capped source that produces offset to the 
market.  The term “buyer” will generally refer to a government agency that is subsidizing the creation of 
offsets, though in some contexts it can refer to a capped source in a cap-and-trade program that desires to 
buy offsets to some of its emissions. 
29
 In a pollution abatement context, it would be the polluter will be awarded if his emission is less than the 
baseline and the award depends on the difference between the smaller actual emission and the baseline. 
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generates and sells offsets to the capped sectors. In their study, the baseline refers to a 
baseline of emission, whch is the negative of environmental service of emission 
abatement. With the objective of maximizing the surplus of both the offset seller and 
buyer minus damage to the environment, they find that whether the optimal baseline 
would be smaller than the expected business as usual depends on the trade-off between 
the damage of non-additional emissions and the benefit of cost savings and it is 
generally desirable to set a baseline lower than the expected business as usual. This 
finding is contrary to the study on the voluntary opt-in component of the sulfur dioxide 
emission trading program in Montero (2000). Montero(2000) favors a low baseline, 
which allows payments for non-additional production and contradicts with the purpose 
of ensuring environmental integrity. Essentially, a low baseline allows all the low cost 
abatement opportunities to participate and at the same time the credit producers receive 
large windfall profits from the credit buyer. This turns out to be efficient because the 
transfer does not affect the objective, which considers only the total welfare. Both 
Horowitz and Just (2011) and Montero (2000) directly link the capped sources with the 
uncapped sources to determine the social optimally optimal level of offsets. However, in 
reality, the decisions of determining the optimal level of offsets and procuring the offsets 
are very likely to be made by different entities. For example, in carbon cap-and-trade 
schemes (and also other air pollution cap-and-trade schemes), the maximum number of 
offsets that can be used by a capped source is often prescribed before the schemes start 
to operate and equilibrium prices are formed. In the case of CRP program and 
international avoided deforestation and biodiversity programs, it is usual that program 
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administrators are endowed with fixed budgeted funding and make decisions only on the 
procurement of environmental service. In these circumstances, these entities will have 
narrower objectives that may or may not be equivalent to social welfare maximization.  
It should be noted that in the baseline method a price (the unit payment) and a quantity 
(the baseline) are specified; or in other words, the baseline method is a combination of 
quantity and price policy instruments. If guaranteeing a particular quantity of additional 
production is the only goal of the regulator, such a combination may not be necessary. 
The regulator can use a price instrument alone to incentivize the environmental 
service—i.e. she can set the baseline at zero and buy excessive production, sufficient to 
ensure that it has procured the given amount of additional production it wants (we will 
refer this method as “the uniform price method” hereafter). This is equivalent to the use 
of a discounted price for offsets generated by the agricultural sector in the climate 
change mitigation context (Kim 2004, Murray et al. 2011).  
Which method is preferable depends on the objective of the policy designer. 
Situated in the context of international avoided deforestation program, van Bentham and 
Kerr (2011) investigates payment schemes to developing countries by developed 
countries. That paper suggests there are three objectives that the scheme designer needs 
to take into account: efficiency,
30
 minimization of cost to the service buyer and 
maximization the extent of additionality.  
                                                 
30
 “Efficiency” has not been explicitly defined in the paper. But equation in the paper suggests: for any 
forest plot which has non-negative opportunity cost of clearance and has value of positive externality 
greater than its opportunity cost, if its clearance were avoided because of the direct payment, then 
efficiency is achieved.   
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Our paper will take the service buyer’s perspective who only values the 
additional production and seeks to minimize her cost of securing that production. 
Investigation on the design of PES programs from this perspective is very important. For 
a lot of PES programs, the service buyer coincides with the regulator who has limited 
amount of financial resource and her sole goal is to incentivize the supply of 
environmental services. Since there are always opportunity costs in spending public 
funding in a specific program instead of others, it would be desirable to make use of this 
funding as efficiently as possible. If the welfare implications of the transfer from tax 
payers to the government and the allocation of governmental funding among different 
programs are not considered, the objective of pursuing cost-effectiveness would be 
equivalent to that of pursuing social optimum.
31
 Cost-effectiveness is always a key 
aspect in the efficiency of environmental programs. And additionality adds a new 
dimension to the evaluation of efficiency. Our analysis makes contribution to the 
ongoing discussion on how to design environmental programs to achieve cost-
effectiveness and additionality simultaneously.  
In addition to the baseline and the uniform price methods, we will also consider a 
more complicated design for the regulator to choose, the screening contract method. 
That method is built on the principal-agent model which is a standard model that 
explores allocation efficiency under asymmetric information and has been applied in 
various contexts (Laffont and Martimort 2002). A typical example is the determination 
                                                 
31
 However, in the climate change mitigation context, the service buyer might be an aggregator who 
bundles offsets generated in the agriculture sector and sells them to the energy sector rather than the 
designer of the whole cap-and-trade program. In that case the most cost-effective approach may be differ 
from the socially optimum outcome.  
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of an optimal pricing strategy of a monopolistic firm who is facing consumers with 
heterogeneous preferences unrevealed. In this context, the principal is the firm and the 
agents are the consumers. The resulting optimal pricing strategy is a non-linear pricing 
schedule that contains different elements. For each consumer, these elements imply 
negative or positive surplus and the agents will choose the one that maximizes their 
surplus and their types are revealed consequently. This strategy enables the firm to 
reduce surplus left to the high value consumers and therefore to make more profits. It is 
called second degree of price discrimination in the pricing context (Waldman 2004). In 
the payment for environmental program service context, the principal and the agents are 
the regulator and the producers respectively. And applying the principal-agent model 
enables the regulator to reduce rent paid to the low cost producers and therefore to 
reduce the total payment for incentivizing additional environmental service production. 
The main difference between the baseline/ uniform price methods and the screening 
method is whether to discriminate or not. 
Several existing studies suggest using screening contract method to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of environmental service program with heterogeneous service 
providers (Wu and Babcock 1995, Smith 1995, Wunder 2005, Ferraro 2008). Wu and 
Babcock (1995) investigates the screening contract design of a green payment program 
which pays farmers to adopt efficient production practice to use less water and fertilizer. 
Smith (1995) applies the same model to the CRP program. Mason and Plantinga (2010) 
explicitly incorporates non-additional production in the cost curves of the producers.  
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The screening contract method leads to a schedule of prices for different 
quantities leaving more “degrees of freedom” at the disposal of the regulator. And 
therefore, there is no wonder that it is more cost-effective (or more profitable) compared 
to a non-price discrimination strategy. However, a further question that should be 
answered is: how much better is the screening method? Or in other words, what is the 
cost effectiveness of these methods relative to each other? This is an important question 
for the regulator who in reality not only makes payments to the producers but also needs 
to pay for all the administrative costs associated with the program—the so-called 
transaction costs. A more complicated policy design would be preferable only when the 
cost saving from the total payment outweighs the additional transaction costs it entails.  
Furthermore, the screening contract method has more than one variant depending 
on how the regulator specifies the contract. The contract variables may include prices 
only. For example, the often-used two-part tariff in which the principal specifies a lump 
sum payment plus a unit charge (Waldman 2004). This variant is also often used in 
regulation literature (for example, the seminal work by Baron and Myerson (1982)). The 
contract could also be a combination of quantity and price as used in Laffont and 
Martimort (2002). These variants are not always equivalent. In the environmental 
program design literature, both variants have been discussed, for example, Smith (1995) 
specifies only a unit payment for land retirement while Wu and Babcock (1995) 
specifies a combination of practice and total payment. But their differences have 
received little attention.  
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In all the existing studies the cost saving of the screening contract method is 
shown with numerical examples and the difference is large in some cases but trivial in 
others. Analytical development of how the cost saving is related to underlying 
parameters has not been explicitly explored. In this paper, we set up an analytical model 
that would enable us to compare the cost-effectiveness across the baseline method, the 
uniform price method and two variants of the screening contract method (figure 4.1). We 
consider a situation in which some of the environmental service producers have non-
additional production and the regulator, who only values the additional production, 
knows the distribution but not the realization of the non-additional production. We will 
define these designs more carefully in the following sections. 
 
Figure 4.1: Summary of Policy Designs Investigated 
We begin with the most abstract two-type model in Section 2. Then we present 
our results in Section 3. We further extend our analysis to the case in which producers 
are continuously distributed in Section 4. We conclude the paper in Section 5.  
Discriminating 
Policy Designs 
schedule that 
contains price and 
quantity 
specification 
schedule that 
contains price 
specification only 
Non-
discrimination 
Policy Designs 
Baseline 
Uniform Price 
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2. Alternative Contract Schemes 
2.1 First-best Contracts with Complete Information 
We first present the complete information case (i.e. the first-best case) based on which 
comparison of alternative feasible schemes under asymmetric information could be done. 
Suppose there is a regulator trying to procure carbon offsets from two types of farmers 
that supply offsets q1 and q2. The producers’ costs, C1 and C2 are defined by the 
following total cost curves: 
  21 1 1 1 1C q , ( q Q )   with 1 0  , if 1q Q ;  1 1 1C q , 0  , if 1q Q  [4.1] 
  22 2 2 2 2C q , q   with 2 0  . [4.2] 
In what follows, we refer to those with total cost curves [4.1] as “Non-additional 
producers” since they have zero cost for the first Q  unit of production and “Additional 
producers” are those with total cost curve [4.2] who incur positive cost for each unit of 
its production. Non-additional producers would provide Q  without any incentive so Q  is 
also called the business-as-usual production. For the reason of convenience, we will 
assume that 2 1a ,a [1, )    , so that the marginal costs of the additional producers 
is weakly greater than that of the non-additional producers. The failure of this 
assumption would complicate the solution to the discriminating design problems. We 
will briefly discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption at the relevant points 
below.  Then their marginal cost curves are respectively (figure 4.2):  
 1 1 1MC 2 q Q   if 1q Q ; 1MC 0  if 1q Q  [4.3] 
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2 2 2MC 2 q .
 [4.4] 
For typical goods in a market with one Non-additional producer and one 
Additional producer, the market supply Q associated with a price p would be  
1 2
1 2
Q p Q
2
 
 
 
  
 
. [4.5] 
But for environmental goods, the first Q  supplied by the non-additional producers 
should not be considered as offsets because they do not satisfy the requirement of 
additionality.  
 
Figure 4.2: Marginal Cost and Supply Curves 
If the regulator has complete information over the producers’ costs, i.e. she 
knows who is associated as which cost curve, then she could design a “take it or leave it” 
quantity-payment contracts for the two producer types, (q1, T1) and (q2, T2). We will 
generalize by allowing the proportion of the producers of each type to vary, i.e. 
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P(θ=θ1)=α1 and P(θ=θ2 )=α2 with α1+α2=1. Let Q0 denote the total expected additional 
units that the regulator needs. 
Then the regulator’s problem can be described as: 
 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
{ q ,T ,( q ,T )}
min TC T T    [4.6] 
Subject to 
2
1 1 1T ( q Q )    [4.7] 
2
2 2 2T q  [4.8] 
1 1 2 2 0( q ) q QQ     [4.9] 
 1 2q Q 0,q 0   . [4.10] 
Constraint [4.7] and [4.8] are participation constraints for the producers, implying that 
the cost of production needs to be at least fully compensated. Since there is no 
requirement that the regulator should pay more than the costs, these two constraints will 
be binding. Constraint [4.9] requires that the total quantity of offsets from all the 
producers be no less than Q0 and it will also be binding.  
Based on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the solution is given by 
1 2
1 2
C C
q q
 

 
  [4.11] 
 1 1 2 2 0Qq q Q     [4.12] 
i i  iT C , 1,2  .
 [4.13] 
Full characterization of the solution is given in Appendix B. Production 
allocation among the Non-additional producers and the Additional producers is 
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determined by equalization of marginal cost and then the non-additional amount is added 
to the contract for the non-additional producers. Because the regulator knows the type of 
each farmer, she is able to differentiate the contracts for different types. It follows that 
the total cost and the marginal cost of the program do not depend on the non-additional 
quantityQ .  
2.2 The Screening Contract Method under Asymmetric Information 
When the cost information is privately held by the producers and the regulator does not 
know who is who, it is not possible to offer differentiated contracts. She needs to design 
a uniform contract for the heterogeneous producers. In what follows, we investigate four 
alternative methods. In each section we first describe the alternative method, set up the 
corresponding regulator’s problem and provide the solution. We then compare all the 
contracts using a numerical example. 
2.2.1 Screening Contract with Price and Quantity Specifications 
The regulator could specify a menu with two different combinations of production 
quantity and payment from which the producers can choose.  
This contract method corresponds to the following problem for the regulator: 
 
 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
{ q ,T ,( q ,T )}
min TC T T    [4.14] 
Subject to 
2
1 1 1T ( q Q )   [4.15] 
2
2 2 2T q  [4.16] 
1 1 2 2 0( q ) q QQ     [4.17] 
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2 2
1 1 1 2 1 2T ( q ) (Q T q )Q      , if 2q Q ; 
2
1 1 1 2 T ( q ) TQ   , otherwise
 [4.18] 
2 2
2 2 2 1 2 1T q T q     [4.19] 
 1 2q 0 qQ , 0   . [4.20] 
The interpretations of constraint [4.15] and [4.16] are straightforward—they are 
the participation constraints that require that the producers’ costs are fully compensated. 
In the first best case, participation constraints of both types are binding. However, in this 
case since the regulator cannot observe which producers are of each type, constraint 
[4.15] will never be binding when q2>0 as 
2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2T ( q Q ) T ( q Q ) T q 0,          . [4.21] 
Or in other words, any combination of quantity and payment designed for the Non-
additional producers must offer him rents no less than that if he chooses the other 
combination designed for the Additional producers. This is the exact implication of 
constraints [4.18] and [4.19] – the incentive compatible constraints. Furthermore, 
equation [4.21] implies that, on one hand, the Non-additional producers can always 
guarantee some profits-- the so-called information rent—since they have the option of 
mimicking the less efficient Additional producers. On the other hand, there is no need to 
leave positive profits for the Additional producers. Therefore, the incentive compatible 
constraint [4.18] for the Non-additional producers will be binding and the participation 
constraint for the Additional producers (constraint [4.16]) will also be binding.  
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Based on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the production allocation between the 
types is given by  
 if?
2
1 1 2 1 2 2 1
0
1 2 2 2 1
C C
1 , Q
q q
Q
    
  
   
   
  
 [4.22] 
1 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 2 2
C C 2
(1 (1 ))
q q
Q   
  
 
   
 
, otherwise [4.23] 
 1 1 2 2 0Qq q Q    . [4.24] 
T1 and T2 are given by constraint [4.16] and [4.18]. Full characterization of the solution 
is given in Appendix B.  
Equations [4.22] and [4.23] suggest that it would always be optimal for the 
regulator to have the non-additional types produce some positive amount of additional 
production and pay them the production cost plus information rent. For the case in 
equation [4.22], the information rent is equal to the total production cost of the 
additional type. For the case in equation [4.23], the information rent is equal to the 
difference in the total production costs of producing q2 between the two types. 
Furthermore, at the optimal production allocation the marginal cost of the Non-
additional producers is greater than that of the Additional producers—i.e. the production 
from the Non-additional producers would be distorted upwards, i.e. SB *1 1q q , compared 
to the first-best case; and accordingly, production from the Additional producers would 
be distorted downwards, i.e. SB *2 2q q . This resembles the downward distortion of the 
production of the less efficient type in the principle-agent model, which is a result of the 
efficiency-information rent tradeoff (Laffont and Martimort 2002).  
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With regard to additionality, it is implied that some payment for the non-
additional production is inevitable under asymmetric information. It is especially clear 
when the production of the Additional producers SB2q is less than the business as usual Q  
of the Non-additional producers. In this case, the non-additional type can guarantee 
positive returns without doing anything.
32
  
2.2.2 Screening Contract with Price Specifications Only 
In our second possible contract design, the regulator specifies a schedule consisting of a 
unit payment plus a lump sum payment. Namely, the regulator specifies different unit 
payments for the environmental service provided, and the producers choose the unit 
payment they would like to receive and decides the quantity they would like to produce 
and at the end, the producers make a lump sum payment back to the regulator, the level 
of which depends on the unit payment. This is equivalent to the method of specifying a 
schedule of type-dependent unit payment and baseline. And it is exactly the method 
suggested in Mason and Plantinga (2010). Let ti and Si denote the unit charge and the 
                                                 
32
 Note, if the assumption 2a 1
1


   fails, then the total cost of the Non-additional producers increases faster 
than that of the Additional producers. Therefore, the total cost of the Non-additional producers would 
intercept with that of the Additional producers at some production level. There are three possibilities of the 
allocation between the producers. The first possibility is that the optimal production quantities of both 
types are smaller than the production level at the intercept. In this case, the total cost of the Non-additional 
producers is smaller than that of the Additional producers. And the Non-additional producers would be the 
type that receives information rents. And the solution to the regulator’s problem is similar to the solution 
with a≥1. The second possibility is that the optimal production quantity of the Non-additional producers 
(the Additional producers) is smaller (greater) than the production at the intercept. And the last possibility 
is that the optimal production quantities of both types are larger than the production level at the intercept. 
In these two cases, the Non-additional producers are not the type that receives information rents and 
therefore, no payment is made to the non-additional production.  
In all, when the assumption 2a 1
1


   fails, the possibility that the Non-additional producers obtain 
information rents based on their non-additional production is limited by their fast-increasing costs. 
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lump sum payment for type i. Then the contract method corresponds to the following 
problem for the regulator:  
 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
{ t ,S ,( t ,S )}
min TC ( q t S ) ( q t S )      [4.25] 
Subject to 
2
1 1 1 1 1q t S ( q Q )    [4.26] 
2
2 2 2 2 2q t S q   [4.27] 
1 1 2 2 0( q Q ) q Q     [4.28] 
2 ' ' 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1q t S ( q ) q t S ( qQ )Q         [4.29] 
2 ' ' 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2q t S q q t S q       [4.30] 
1 1 12 ( q ) tQ    [4.31] 
2 2 22 q t   [4.32] 
'q1 1 22 ( ) tQ    [4.33] 
'
2 2 12 q t   [4.34] 
'   '1 1 2 2q Q 0,q 0,q 0,qQ 0      . [4.35] 
Equations [4.26] and [4.27] and equations [4.29] and [4.30] are the participation 
constraints and incentive compatibility constraints, respectively, similar to the ones in 
the method of screening contract with price and quantity specifications. As in that model, 
the participation constraint for the Additional producers [4.27] will bind, as will the 
incentive compatibility constraint for the Non-additional producers [4.29]. However, 
when the screening contract is specified in this way, there is no requirement that 
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producers who choose the same unit charge produce the same quantity. Rather, each will 
choose its production to maximize its profit, so the production quantity is always set 
where marginal cost equals the unit payment (equations [4.31] through [4.34]). 
Based on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the production allocation between the 
types is determined by  
1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 2
QC C 2
1 1
q q
   
  
   
         
, if 
2
1 2
0
2 1
Q Q
 
 
  [4.36] 
 1 01 2
1 1 2
2 QC C
, 0
q q


 
 
 
otherwise  [4.37] 
 1 1 2 2 0q Q q Q    . [4.38] 
The whole problem can be solved based on the optimal production allocation, the 
binding constraints [4.27] and [4.29] and the production decision constraints [4.31] and 
[4.32]. If a baseline is specified instead of the lump sum payment that the producers need 
to pay back to the regulator, then the baseline for type i equals the lump sum payment Si 
divided by the unit charge ti. Full characterization of the solution is given in Appendix B.  
2.3 The Non-discriminating Contracts 
2.3.1 The Uniform Price Method 
The uniform price method refers to a contract in which the regulator sets a unit price for 
all production and leaves the producers to decide their production quantities. The 
regulator determines the unit price by backward induction. For every unit price, the 
regulator will anticipate a certain amount of production from the producers so that the 
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additional quantity can be anticipated. Finally the unit price is chosen to ensure that the 
target is reached.  
This contract method corresponds to the following problem for the regulator:  
1 1 2 2
t
minTC q t q t    [4.39] 
Subject to  
1 12 ( q )Q t    [4.40] 
2 22 q t   [4.41] 
1 1 2 2 0( q Q ) q Q    . [4.42] 
Note that the number of variables at the regulator’s disposal is reduced greatly 
from 4 in the screening contract method to 1 in this case. The decisions of the producers 
are nested in constraints [4.40] and [4.41] which follow from profit maximizing behavior. 
In this unit price method, production from all of the producers will be always non-zero 
as each unit of production will be paid a positive price while marginal costs start at zero 
and we assume there are no fixed costs. Production quantity is determined by equating 
marginal cost to marginal revenue.  
Based on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the producers’ problems, we know that  
1 2
1 2
C C
t
q q
 
 
 
, [4.43] 
yielding equations [4.40] and [4.41].  In order for a contract to be accepted, the 
producer’s revenue must exceed the production costs, i.e.  
 
i
ii i i i i
* * dq
q
|q q
0
T q t q MC MC q    . [4.44] 
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Since we assume that firms have no fixed costs, the participation constraint will not bind 
for either producer type. 
Full characterization of the solution is given in Appendix B. The production 
allocation between the two types resembles the first-best case (equation [4.43]) but 
payments to the producers (and therefore cost of the program) would be larger (equation 
[4.44]). In addition to producer surplus paid to the additional units, the Non-additional 
producers get extra surplus because the same unit price is also paid to the non-additional 
units (Area I in figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3: Payments to the Producers under the Uniform Price Method  
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2.3.2 The Baseline Method 
To avoid paying for the non-additional units, a common approach is for the regulator to 
announce a “baseline” and only pay for the part of production great than the baseline. 
However, in our setting, since the regulator does not know who has non-additional 
production, this has to be applied uniformly. We refer this to the “baseline” contract.  
This contract method corresponds to the following problem for the regulator:  
   1 1 2 2ˆ( Q,t )
ˆ ˆminTC q Q t q Q t      [4.45] 
Subject to 
  1 1 Q2 q t   if    
2
1 1 1
ˆq Q t Qq   ; 1q Q , otherwise [4.46] 
2 22 q t   if   22 2 2q tQ qˆ    ; 2q 0 , otherwise [4.47] 
 1 1 2 2 0q Q q Q   
.
 [4.48] 
Now, the contract offered to the producers contains two variables: the baseline Qˆ  and 
the unit price t. The uniform price contract can be regarded as a degeneration of the 
baseline method where the baseline is set to equal 0.  
On the producer side, constraints [4.46] and [4.47] represent the decisions of the 
producers. Again, the producers have two decisions to make: whether to produce and 
how much to produce. It is easier to solve for these two decisions backwards than 
forwards. The quantity to produce depends only on the unit payment, which is simply a 
re-arrangement of the equation representing the equalization of marginal cost and 
marginal benefit. Furthermore, when both types are active in the program, the production 
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allocation between the two types again follows 1 2
1 2
C C
t
q q
 
 
 
. The baseline, on the 
other hand, only affects the producers’ decision on whether to produce but not the 
production quantity. Substituting the unit payment t in the inequalities in equations [4.46] 
and [4.47] with qi, it follows that the highest level of baseline that keeps the producers 
from exiting production would be i
i
t
Q
4
 , implying that the producers would always 
accept a baseline that is slightly higher than their individual business as usual.  
Although the business as usual Q seems to be a natural candidate for the baseline; 
it does not necessarily minimize the total cost. In the next two sections we first examine 
the case where Qˆ Q and then examine the situation where the regulator strategically 
chooses Qˆ  to minimize total cost. 
2.3.2.1 Take the Business As Usual As Baseline Qˆ Q  
For the Non-additional producers, setting Qˆ Q  ensures that only additional production 
is paid. Therefore, for given unit price t, 1
1
Q
t
q
2
  and this leaves them profit 
 
2
2
1 1 1
1
Q Q
t
q t ( q )
4


    . For the Additional producers, however, the cost of 
producing the baseline amount becomes a fixed cost, and they will only participate when 
the unit price is high enough that the fixed cost is fully compensated. Replacing the Qˆ  in 
constraint [4.47] with Q , it can be derived from that the break-even price for the 
Additional producers is  2t Q4 . And producers will earn profit when 2t Q4 .  
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The solution depends on the relation between the baseline Q  and the expected 
production Q0. When Q0 is small relative to Q  (namely, 
1 2
0
1
Q
2
Q
 

 ), there is no need 
to set the unit payment to be greater than the break-even price of the Additional 
producers. By setting the unit payment equal to 1 0
1
2 Q

, the regulator reaches its target 
Q0 by procuring from the Non-additional producers only. The additional producers will 
be left out of the program. 
When Q0 is large (
1 2
0
1
Q
2
Q
 

 ), the unit payment t will be large enough to 
induce production from both types. When t is exactly equal to 24 Q , the Additional 
producers is indifferent between to participate the program and not to participate but 
each of them have to sell 2Q  so that their cost would be fully compensated. And the 
regulator is able to buy 1 2 2 10
1
2( )
Q
Q   


  at the maximum without increasing the 
unit payment t. To find out the market equilibrium and the total payment of the program 
for this small range of target, we need to add an ancillary assumption that not every 
additional producer would participate. As Q0 continues to increase to be greater than
1 2 2 1
1
( )Q2    


, the target constraint will bind again and to induce additional 
environmental service production to reach the desired level the unit payment t needs be 
greater than the break-even price for the Non-additional producers. The production 
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allocation is again determined by equalization of marginal cost of the two types. But the 
regulator pays less to the producer than that in the uniform price case. 
1 2
1 2
C C
q q
 

 
 [4.49] 
 1 1 2 2 0Qq q Q     [4.50] 
ii i i|q q
T ( q Q )* MC    [4.51] 
Full characterization of the solution is presented in Appendix B. 
2.3.2.2 When the Baseline is Determined by Cost Minimization (Optimal Baseline) 
Consider the situation in the previous section. Whoever is producing, earns positive 
profits. It is tempting for the regulator to raise the baseline as long as the increase of 
baseline does not cause the producers to exit production. By so doing the regulator can 
procure the same amount of production but reduce payments. 
On one hand, for any given Qˆ , q1, q2 and t can be solved from constraints [4.46] 
through [4.48] which constitute a system of just-identified equations. On the other hand, 
Qˆ
TC
t 0

  

 meaning that total cost decreases with higher baseline ceteris paribus.  
Together, they imply that under given unit price t, the regulator can continue to raise the 
baseline without increasing t as long as it does not change the participation decisions of 
the producers.  
But one question remains for the regulator: whether to have one type or both 
types to produce. Figure 4.4 demonstrates the situation. In the figure we assume that by 
setting the unit price at t1, the regulator induces additional production quantities equal to 
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OE and OB from the Non-additional producers and Additional producers respectively, 
which sum to Q0. In this case, the cost-minimizing baseline would be OA=OB/2 which 
leaves zero profit for the Additional producers and profit for the Non-additional 
producers equals the area of AGIC. Total cost of the program equals
 α *S AGHB α *S AGIE1 2 ( ) , where S() represents the area of the rectangle.  
On the other hand, it is also possible to obtain Q0 from the Non-additional types 
alone.  In this case the regulator would set the baseline higher but the cost of production 
would be higher since it excludes the low-cost production from the Additional producers. 
It can be solved that q1=OF, q2=0 and t=t2 and the baseline would be OD=OC+(OF-
OC)/2=OF/2+OC/2 which leaves zero profit for both types of producers. The regulator’s 
total cost equals  α *S DJKF1 . Which way has a lower cost to the regulator is not clear. 
In our two-type model, the problem can be solved analytically. The full characterization 
of solutions under both situations is shown in table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of Total Costs in the Optimal Baseline Case 
Table 4.1: Characterization of Solution in the Optimal Baseline Case 
 
Unit 
Payment 
t 
Production of 
Non-
additional 
Producers 
1q  
Productio
n of 
Additional 
Producers 
2q  
Optimal 
Baseline 
Qˆ  
Total Cost to Regulator 
   
BA_bot
h 
0
1 2
1 2
Q
2 2
 
 

 
2 0
2 1 1 2
Q
Q

   


 
1 0
2 1 1 2
Q
   
 
1 0
2 1 1 2
Q
2 2

   
 
  21 2 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 2 0
2
2 1 1 22 1 1 2
Q[ 2 ]Q 2 Q
( )
         
      
 


 
BA_low 
1 0
1
2 Q

 
0
1
Q
Q

  0 0
1
Q
2
Q

  
21
0
1
Q


 
Note: BA_both refers to the situation in which Q0 is produced by both types and BA_low refers to the 
situation in which Q0 is produced by the Non-additional producers only. 
 The most interesting points in table 4.1 lie in the last two columns. First, when 
the target Q0 is small it is always better to leave the additional type producers out of the 
program. As Q0 increases, the optimal strategy will switch to setting a low-baseline to 
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include the additional type at some point if  1 2 2 1 1 1 21
2
1 2 1 1 2
2 [ 2 ]2
( )
      
    
 


   (i.e. 
2 1
1 1
2 
 

 ) (Proof in Appendix C.1). Second, the optimal baseline is linearly increasing 
in the target Q0 under both cases. Especially, when both types are producing, the optimal 
baseline does not depend on the additionality parameter at all. It is possible that the 
baseline falls below the business as usual Q  when the optimal baseline suddenly drops 
as the optimal strategy switches from being open to one type to being open to both types 
and then the optimal baseline continues to increase with Q0 and will pass Q  again. 
3. Comparison of Different Designs 
3.1 General Results 
Solving the problems corresponding to different policy designs leads us to the following 
results: 
1) The ranking of designs based on total cost to the regulator (from lowest total 
cost to highest) is as follows:  
 the screening-contract method with price and quantity specifications,  
 the screening-contract method with price specification only,  
 the optimal baseline method,  
 the business as usual baseline method,  
 the uniform price method.  
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When both the target and the proportion of non-additional producers are small, the 
uniform price method may be a good choice for its total cost could be much lower than 
the business as usual baseline method and close to the optimal baseline method. This is 
demonstrated in the left panel of figures 4.5 and 4.6 where a numerical example is 
provided demonstrating how the total costs to the regulator of different designs change 
with changes in the proportion of the non-additional producers, α1, and the target level 
of production, Q0, respectively. Analytical rankings of the different policies are derived 
in Appendix C.2. 
 
Figure 4.5: Total Costs of Alternative Designs for Different Values of α1 (Business as 
Usual Q =20, a=1.5) 
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Figure 4.6: Total Costs of Alternative Designs for Various Targets (Business as Usual Q
=20, a=1.5) 
2) As seen in figure 4.7, the ratios of the total costs of the methods discussed 
relative to the total cost in the first best case converge to certain values as the target 
approaches positive infinity. For the screening-contract methods and the baseline-
optimal, the values of the convergence depend on the difference in the marginal costs of 
the producers, a. When the marginal cost curves of different type producers are only 
different in their locations but not in their slopes, i.e. a=1, the total costs of the screening 
contract methods and the baseline-optimal method relative that of the first best case 
converge to 1.  
The ratios of the total costs of the uniform price method and the 
baseline_business as usual method relative to the total cost of the first-best case 
converge to 2 regardless of the values of cost differences and the distribution of the two 
types. 
Analytical solution is derived in Appendix C.3. 
α1=0.3 α1=0.7 
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Figure 4.7: Total Costs of Alternative Designs Relative to the First-Best Case (Business 
as Usual Q =20) 
3) As seen in figure 4.8, as the proportion of either type becomes larger, there is a 
tendency for the total cost of the second-best screening contract to converge to that of 
the first-best case. Furthermore, the total cost of the optimal baseline method converges 
to that of the second-best case (and therefore also the first-best case). This is because as 
the group of producers becomes less heterogeneous, the regulator pays less information 
rents and the outcome approaches closer to the first-best case. 
The analytical is derived in Appendix C.4. 
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Figure 4.8: Total Costs of Alternative Designs for Different Proportions  
of the Non-additional Producers ( Q =20, a=1.5) 
4) As total cost and therefore marginal cost of procuring given amount of 
environmental service depend on the contract design used in the procurement, different 
methods used would very likely imply different social optimal levels of environmental 
service. This is certain when the marginal benefits do not depend on the payment, which 
holds for many environmental services. Figure 4.9 demonstrates this pattern using a 
numerical example. We see that the marginal cost to the regulator is always lowest with 
the first-best contract. However, presuming that that policy is not available, the regulator 
should choose the policy which achieves the lowest cost and that may vary depending on 
the size of the target. Moreover, if the regulator represents the public that benefits from 
the acquisition of production, the optimal level of production would be where the 
marginal benefit to the public equals the marginal cost to the regulator. Hence, the 
optimal value for Q  will vary depending on which designs is available to the regulator.  
104 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Marginal Costs of Alternative Designs against the Target (Business as Usual 
Q =20, a=1.5) 
4. Model Extension 
In Appendix D we extend our analysis to a more general case in which there is a 
continuous distribution case of producer types, each with a different level of business as 
usual production. For analytical convenience we assume that the producers share the 
same slope of the marginal cost curves but their business as usual production Q  follows 
a distribution over the interval [0, ] . Namely, the total cost curve of the producers can 
be represented as equation [4.52]: 
  2TC ( q )    , where θ is uniformly distributed between [0, ] . [4.52] 
And therefore, the marginal cost curve would be: 
 MC 2 ( q )q    . [4.53] 
As shown in the appendix, the first-best, second-best cases and uniform price method are 
formulated by replacing the summation over α1 and α2 with the integral over the 
105 
 
 
 
distribution. Results regarding the cost-effectiveness and the convergence of the ratios of 
the total costs of different designs relative to that of the first best case still hold. 
5. Limitations and Conclusion 
Additionality is one of the major concerns in designing efficient Payments for 
Environmental Service programs. In this paper, we have investigated four contract 
designs of these programs, including two variants of discriminating method, the baseline 
method and the uniform method in the situation in which the service buyer knows the 
existence but not the specific sources of the non-additional services and aims to 
minimize the costs of procuring given amount of additional environmental services.  
The limitations of our study come in the following regards. Firstly, the 
assumption on the knowledge of the regulator is quite strong. In practice, it may be very 
costly or impossible for her to develop knowledge on the cost parameters of the 
individual producers and the associated distribution. Furthermore, our model is rather 
abstract. The lack of empirical and institutional context means that substantial work 
needs to be done before the idea could be used in practice. In spite of these limitations, 
our model has led to some interesting findings. 
We find that the screening contract method is the most cost-effective, especially 
when the buyer specifies a schedule of combinations of production quantity and total 
payment, which agrees with the general regulation literature. The existence of non-
additional environmental service opens up new policy design possibility, i.e. the baseline 
method in which the service buyer specifies a baseline and makes payments to services 
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above the baseline only. We find that when the baseline is determined by program cost 
minimization, the cost of the baseline method is only slightly higher than the screening 
contract method. Furthermore, the optimal baseline increases with the procurement 
target. In other words, when the target is large enough, the optimal baseline would be 
larger than the non-additional production of any producer. On the other hand, if the 
baseline is rigidly set (for example at the business as usual level), the cost of the baseline 
method could be greater than that of the uniform price method in which the service 
buyer simply sets a price to buy all the environmental service produced.    
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Major Findings 
Climate change presents a great challenge to scientists, policy makers and the global 
society. This dissertation focuses on the issues of leakage and additionality in realizing 
the climate change mitigation opportunities in the agricultural sector. 
The first two essays of this dissertation (Chapter II and Chapter III) are devoted 
to development of a global partial equilibrium agricultural sector model with a detailed 
US component. And in the second essay, the model is applied to analyze implications of 
technological progress in US crop yield growth on the international effects of US 
bioenergy policy based on new econometric estimates of the trends in US crop yield 
growth rates over the past 70 years. Slowdowns in the 1960s and 1970s are found to be 
significant and prevalent in US crop yield growth rates. The importance of the 
assumptions regarding technological progress is exhibited in our analysis of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which is our reference bioenergy policy. It is found 
that the RFS policy, on the producer’s side, diverts land to plantations of bioenergy 
feedstock crops from other crops and, on the consumer’s side, diverts crop usage to 
bioenergy production to from other purposes. These effects are significant in the short-
term if crop yields grow at their current rates. In the medium term, technology progress 
would play a bigger role in determining crop production. However, in terms of welfare 
and leakage, the RFS tends to have larger impacts than technological progress over the 
108 
 
 
 
whole simulation period. Our model predicts that if US crops grow at the current rate, 
the implementation of RFS policy would cause an addition of 1.16 million hectares of 
agricultural land expansion in rest of the world, which comes from deforestation and loss 
of natural land. Although there is great uncertainty in this quantitative result, which is 
inherent in making future predictions, our research offers several important messages. A 
slowing in crop yield growth rates would lead to large increases in clearance of forest 
and natural land while higher technological progress would mitigate the leakage effect of 
the RFS policy. Whether the leakage effect can be completely offset depends on the mix 
of yield growth of all crops. Furthermore, specific regions could incur larger loss of 
forest land and/or natural land in scenarios with higher crop yield growth rates. 
The third essay (Chapter IV) is devoted to investigate the additionality problem 
in designing Payments for Environmental Service programs. Four contract designs of 
these programs are investigated in the situation in which the service buyer knows the 
existence but not the specific sources of the non-additional services and aims to 
minimize the costs of procuring given amount of additional environmental services. The 
key finding is that the existence of non-additional environmental service opens up new 
policy design possibilities. Of particular interest is the baseline method in which the 
service buyer specifies a baseline and makes payments to services above the baseline 
only. And when the baseline is set to minimize costs, the cost is only slightly higher than 
the second-best screening contract method. Furthermore, a cost minimizing baseline 
would generally deviate from the non-additional production (the so-called business-as-
usual level) of the producers and increase with the procurement target.  
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2. Possible Future Works 
The modeling exercise in the dissertation is an attempt to make better assessment of the 
leakage effect in increasing the role of the agricultural sector in climate change 
mitigation. Our sensitive analysis shows that there are at least two aspects of which the 
model can be further improved: 1) the trade component is not very well calibrated, 
which is an important factor in determining the special distribution of the leakage effect; 
2) the one period ahead simulation suggests the demand growth parameters in the model 
is very possibly smaller than the actual value. This would result in underestimation of 
the leakage effect, provided that land with high productivity is first converted for 
production. 
We further examine the relationship between technological progress and leakage. 
This analysis not only highlights the important of technological progress but also reveals 
that the mix of progress in different crops also matter in determining the leakage effect. 
Future work could extend the analysis to model yield growth with the production 
function approach so as to offer better understanding on the sources of yield growth. 
Additionality is another barrier in realizing the climate change mitigation 
opportunities in the agricultural sector. The last essay offers interesting insights in 
achieving additionality in policy design. Directions of future work include, for example, 
to extend the analysis to real world programs or to develop empirical models to test the 
theoretical findings.
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APPENDIX A 
Soybean-Estimation 
Model Estimation Result 
Break 
Year 
Ljung-Box Test 
(5% Confidence) 
Implied Growth Rate 
SSE/MSE Beginning of the 
Period 
End of the 
Period 
Simple Linear Model – No break point a=-681.95       b=0.36 -- Fail to Reject 2.22% 0.81% SSE=335.66 MSE=4.94 
Simple Exponential Model –No break point a=-23.41         b=0.013 -- Fail to Reject 1.28% 1.28% SSE=293.04 MSE=4.31 
Model 1 a1=-70.51       b1=0.038 
1979 
Reject 3.80% 3.80% 
SSE=279.20 MSE=4.23 
(Exponential + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-960.27     b2=0.50 Fail to Reject 1.89% 1.13% 
Model 2 a1=-20.45       b1=0.012 
1988 
Reject 1.20% 1.20% 
SSE=285.47 MSE=4.33 
(Exponential  + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-18.58       b2=0.011 Fail to Reject 1.10% 1.10% 
Model 3 a1=-560.92     b1=0.30 
1988 
Reject 1.85% 0.93% 
SSE=278.04 MSE=4.21 
(Linear + Exponential -unrestricted) a2=-18.58       b2=0.011 Fail to Reject 1.10% 1.10% 
Model 4 a1=-560.92     b1=0.30 
1988 
Reject 1.85% 0.93% 
SSE=277.82 MSE=4.21 
(Linear + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-812.52     b2=0.43 Fail to Reject 1.62% 0.98% 
Model 5 a1=-21.00       b1=0.012 
1984 
Reject 1.20% 1.20% 
SSE=289.92 MSE=4.33 
(Exponential + Linear-restricted) a2=-904.00     b2=0.47 Fail to Reject 1.38% 1.06% 
Model 6 a1=-24.36       b1=0.014 
1959 
Fail to Reject 1.40% 1.40% 
SSE=291.98 MSE=4.36 
(Exponential  + Exponential -restricted) a2=-21.39       b2=0.013 Reject 1.30% 1.30% 
Model 7 a1=-577.87     b1=0.31 
1983 
Fail to Reject 1.91% 1.18% 
SSE=289.31 MSE=4.32 
(Linear + Exponential-restricted) a2=-23.41       b2=0.014 Reject 1.40% 1.40% 
Model 8 a1=-565.43     b1=0.3 
1983 
Fail to Reject 1.85% 1.15% 
SSE=284.65 MSE=4.25 
(Linear + Linear-restricted) a2= -932.29    b2=0.49 Fail to Reject 1.74% 1.11% 
Soybean-Validation 
Model Estimation Result-0 Estimation Result-5 
Out of sample 
Prediction Error-5 
Estimation Result-10 
Out of sample 
Prediction Error-10 
Simple Exponential Model- 
No break point 
SSE=293.04   MSE=4.31 
a=-23.41         b=0.014 
SSE=276.82  MSE=4.39 
a=-21.57, b=0.013 
16.64 
SSE=234.96 MSE=4.05 
a=-22.26, b=0.013 
60.78 
Model 3 
(Linear + Exponential-
unrestricted) 
SSE=278.04 MSE=4.21 
Year=1988 
SSE=259.30 MSE=4.25 
Year=1988 
27.08 
SSE=217.58 MSE=3.89 
Year=1979 
150.18 
a1=-560.92     b1=0.30 a1=-560.92     b1=0.30 a1=-593.67    b1=0.32 
a2=-18.58       b2=0.011 a2=-14.54       b2=0.09 a2=-31.20      b2=0.017 
Model 4  
(Linear + Linear-
unrestricted) 
SSE=277.82 MSE=4.21 
Year=1988 
SSE=258.63 MSE=4.24 
Year=1988 
28.21 
SSE=215.73 MSE=3.85 
Year=1982 
122.57 
a1=-560.92     b1=0.30 a1=-560.92     b1=0.30 a1=-582.19     b1=0.31 
a2=-812.52     b2=0.43 a2=-645.08     b2=0.34 a2=-1244.29  b2=0.64 
Model 8 
(Linear + Linear-restricted) 
SSE=284.65 MSE=4.25 
Year=1983 
SSE=268.88 MSE=4.34 
Year=1983 
16.62 
SSE=221.94 MSE=3.89 
Year=1988 
141.07 
a1=-565.43     b1=0.3 a1=-568.53    b1=0.30 a1=-575.16     b1=0.31 
a2= -932.29    b2=0.49 a2=-904.53    b2=0.47 a2=-1329.56   b2=0.69 
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Wheat-Estimation 
Model Estimation Result 
Break 
Year 
Ljung-Box Implied Growth Rate 
SSE/MSE 
Test 
Beginning of 
the Period 
End of the 
Period 
Simple Linear Model –No break point a=-815.60       b=0.43 -- Reject 2.81% 0.97% SSE=441.68 MSE=6.50 
Simple Exponential Model –No break point a=-23.63         b=0.014 -- Reject 1.40% 1.40% SSE=640.93 MSE=9.43 
Model 1 a1=-36.89       b1=0.020 
1985 
Reject 2.0% 2.0% 
SSE=342.36 MSE=5.19 
(Exponential + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-699.12     b2=0.37 Fail to Reject 1.07% 0.84% 
Model 2 a1=-36.89       b1=0.020 
1985 
Reject 2.00% 2.00% 
SSE=342.98 MSE=5.20 
(Exponential  + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-15.11       b2=0.009 Fail to Reject 0.90% 0.90% 
Model 3 a1=-982.27     b1=0.51 
1985 
Reject 3.33% 1.36% 
SSE=359.53 MSE=5.45 
(Linear + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-15.11       b2=0.009 Fail to Reject 0.90% 0.90% 
Model 4 a1=-982.27     b1=0.51 
1985 
Reject 3.33% 1.36% 
SSE=358.90 MSE=5.44 
(Linear + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-699.12     b2=0.37 Fail to Reject 1.07% 0.84% 
Model 5 a1=-51.77       b1=0.028 
1959 
Fail to Reject 2.80% 2.80% 
SSE=407.69 MSE=6.08 
(Exponential + Linear-restricted) a2=-754.65     b2=0.40 Fail to Reject 1.53% 0.90% 
Model 6 a1=-44.70       b1=0.023 
1972 
Fail to Reject 2.30% 0.90% 
SSE=355.78 MSE=5.31 
(Exponential  + Exponential -restricted) a2=-14.37       b2=0.009 Fail to Reject 2.30% 0.90% 
Model 7 a1=-950.71     b1=0.50 
1983 
Reject 3.27% 1.27% 
SSE=373.45 MSE=5.57 
(Linear + Exponential-restricted) a2=-11.20       b2=0.007 Fail to Reject 0.70% 0.70% 
Model 8 a1=-948.72     b1=0.50 
1983 
Reject 3.27% 1.27% 
SSE=375.09 MSE=5.60 
(Linear + Linear-restricted) a2=-530.31     b2=0.29 Fail to Reject 0.75% 0.65% 
Wheat-Validation 
Model Estimation Result-0 Estimation Result-5 
Out of sample 
Prediction Error-5 
Estimation Result-10 
Out of 
sample 
Prediction 
Error-10 
Simple Linear Model-  
No break point 
SSE=441.68 MSE=6.50 a=-815.60       
b=0.43 
SSE=394.95  MSE=6.27 
a=-844.12, b=0.44 
55.18 
SSE=330.43 MSE=5.69 
a=-870.54, b=0.46 
143.70 
Model 1 
(Exponential + Linear-
unrestricted) 
SSE=342.36 MSE=5.19 Year=1985 
SSE=315.61 MSE=5.17 
Year=1985 
32.36 
SSE=263.37 MSE=4.70 Year=1985 
121.65 
a1=-36.89       b1=0.020 a1=-36.89       b1=0.020 a1=-36.89      b1=0.020 
a2=-699.12     b2=0.37 a2=-507.18     b2=0.42 a2=-980.62    b2=0.511 
Model 2 
(Exponential  + 
Exponential-
unrestricted) 
SSE=342.98 MSE=5.20 Year=1985 
SSE=315.52 MSE=5.17 
Year=1985 
36.03 
SSE=262.29 MSE=4.68 Year=1985 
155.46 
a1=-36.89       b1=0.020 a1=-36.89       b1=0.020 a1=-36.89       b1=0.020 
a2=-15.11       b2=0.009 a2=-18.38       b2=0.011 a2=-24.01       b2=0.014 
Model 6 
(Exponential + 
Exponential-restricted) 
SSE=355.78 MSE=5.31 Year=1972 
SSE=328.56 MSE=5.29 
Year=1971 
30.87 
SSE=277.59 MSE=4.87 Year=1971 
91.43 a1=-44.70       b1=0.023 a1=-44.14       b1=0.024 a1=-43.75       b1=0.024 
   
a2=-14.37       b2=0.009 a2=-15.38       b2=0.010 a2=-16.22       b2=0.010 
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Cotton-Estimation 
Model Estimation Result 
Break 
Year 
Ljung-Box Implied Growth Rate 
SSE/MSE 
Test 
Beginning of 
the Period 
End of the 
Period 
Simple Linear Model –No break point a=-14928.76       b=7.82 -- Reject 3.09% 1.00% SSE=228540.84 MSE=3360.89 
Simple Exponential Model –No break point a=-23.87            b=0.015 -- Reject 1.50% 1.50% SSE=240504.77 MSE=3536.83 
Model 1 a1=-53.94           b1=0.030 
1968 
Reject 3.00% 3.00% 
SSE=174773.25 MSE=2648.08 
(Exponential + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-18361.00     b2=9.54 Fail to Reject 2.20% 1.22% 
Model 2 a1=-63.60           b1=0.034 
1965 
Reject 3.40% 3.40% 
SSE=166730.98 MSE=2526.23 
(Exponential  + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-23.32           b2=0.015 Fail to Reject 1.50% 1.50% 
Model 3 a1=-21473.04     b1=11.18 
1968 
Reject 4.42% 2.17% SSE=172089.35 
MSE=2607.414 (Linear + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-24.80           b2=0.016 Reject 1.60% 1.60% 
Model 4 a1=-21473.04     b1=11.18 
1968 
Reject 4.42% 2.17% 
SSE=175296.40 MSE=2656.01 
(Linear + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-18361.00     b2=9.54 Fail to Reject 2.20% 1.23% 
Model 5 a1=-53.82           b1=0.031 
1959 
Reject 3.10% 3.10% 
SSE=221114.51 MSE=3300.22 
(Exponential + Linear-restricted) a2=-13875.67     b2=7.29 Reject 1.63% 0.94% 
Model 6 a1=-58.04           b1=0.033 
1959 
Reject 3.30% 3.30% 
SSE=196029.15 MSE=2925.81 
(Exponential  + Exponential-restricted) a2=-19.56           b2=0.013 Reject 1.30% 1.30% 
Model 7 a1=-19180.01     b1=10.00 
1959 
Reject 3.95% 2.17% 
SSE=200398.61 MSE=2991.02 
(Linear + Exponential-restricted) a2=-20.28           b2=0.013 Reject 1.30% 1.30% 
Model 8 a1=-13331.57     b1=7.00 
1980 
Reject 2.77% 1.73% 
SSE=221025.06 MSE=3298.88 
(Linear + Linear-restricted) a2=-17546.99     b2=9.13 Fail to Reject 1.68% 1.18% 
Cotton-Validation 
Model Estimation Result-0 Estimation Result-5 
Out of sample 
Prediction Error-5 
Estimation Result-10 
Out of sample 
Prediction Error-
10 
Simple Linear Model- 
No break point 
SSE=228540.84 MSE=3360.89 
a=-14928.76       b=7.82 
SSE=198040.33 MSE=3143.49 
a=-14070.00, b=7.38 
38155.61 
SSE=174449.327 MSE=3007.74 
a=-13856.30, b=7.27 
65988.49 
Model 2 
(Exponential  + 
Exponential-
unrestricted) 
SSE=166730.98 MSE=2526.23 
Year=1965 
SSE= 149416.60 MSE= 2449.45 
Year=1965 
23595.45 
SSE=128365.87 MSE=2292.24 
Year=1965 
47840.58 
a1=-63.60           b1=0.034 a1=-63.60           b1=0.034 a1=-63.60           b1=0.034 
a2=-23.32           b2=0.015 a2=-20.90           b2=0.014 a2=-20.27           b2=0.013 
Model 3  
(Linear + 
Exponential-
unrestricted) 
SSE=172089.35 MSE=2607.414 
Year=1968 
SSE= 175970.26 MSE= 2838.23 
Year=1960 
34794.09 
SSE= 152525.86 MSE= 2675.89 
Year=1960 
70560.15 
a1=-21473.04     b1=11.18 a1= -20673.55     b1= 10.76 a1= -21247.65     b1= 11.06 
a2=-24.80           b2=0.016 a2= -17.40           b2= 0.012 a2= -16.21           b2= 0.011 
Model 6 
(Exponential  + 
Exponential-
restricted) 
SSE=196029.15 MSE=2925.81 
Year=1959 
SSE=170609.23 MSE=2751.76 
Year=1959 
36490.16 
SSE=146678.51 MSE=2573.30 
Year=1959 
74656.83 
a1=-58.04           b1=0.033 a1=-61.96      b1=0.035 a1=-63.89     b1=0.036 
a2=-19.56           b2=0.013 a2=-16.98      b2=0.012 a2= -15.67    b2=0.011 
  
 
 
1
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Sorghum-Estimation 
Model Estimation Result 
Break 
Year 
Ljung-Box Implied Growth Rate 
SSE/MSE 
Test 
Beginning of 
the Period 
End of the 
Period 
Simple Linear Model –No break point a=-884.18       b=0.46 -- Reject 6.13% 1.19% SSE=1530.81 MSE=22.51 
Simple Exponential Model –No break point a=-27.39         b=0.016 -- Reject 1.60% 1.60% SSE=2202.44 MSE=32.39 
Model 1 a1=-75.57        b1=0.04 
1959 
Reject 4.00% 4.00% 
SSE=721.02 MSE=10.92 
(Exponential + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-450.77       b2=0.24 Fail to Reject 1.09% 0.62% 
Model 2 a1=-106.05      b1=0.056 
1964 
Reject 5.6% 5.6% 
SSE=694.24 MSE=10.52 
(Exponential  + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-7.90          b2=0.006 Reject 0.6% 0.6% 
Model 3 a1=-803.94      b1=0.41 
1959 
Reject 5.47% 2.04% 
SSE=754.69 MSE=11.44 
(Linear + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-11.04         b2=0.007 Fail to Reject 0.70% 0.70% 
Model 4 a1=-803.94       b1=0.41 
1959 
Reject 5.47% 2.04% 
SSE=734.76 MSE=11.13 
(Linear + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-450.77       b2=0.24 Fail to Reject 1.09% 0.62% 
Model 5 a1=-112.37       b1=0.059 
1966 
Reject 5.90% 5.90% 
SSE=694.66 MSE=10.37 
(Exponential + Linear-restricted) a2=-356.76       b2=0.20 Reject 2.67% 0.65% 
Model 6 a1=-133.48       b1=0.050 
1966 
Reject 5.00% 5.00% 
SSE=699.45 MSE=10.44 
(Exponential  + Exponential-restricted) a2=-8.13           b2=0.005 Reject 0.50% 0.50% 
Model 7 a1=-1573.61     b1=0.81 
1972 
Reject 10.8% 2.4% 
SSE=838.35 MSE=12.51 
(Linear + Exponential-restricted) a2=-7.04          b2=0.005 Fail to Reject 0.50% 0.50% 
Model 8 a1=-1596.32     b1=0.83 
1971 
Reject 11.07% 2.78% 
SSE=835.09 MSE=12.46 
(Linear + Linear-restricted) a2=-348.67       b2=0.19 Fail to Reject 0.56% 0.49% 
Sorghum-Validation 
Model Estimation Result-0 Estimation Result-5 
Out of sample 
Prediction Error-5 
Estimation Result-10 
Out of sample 
Prediction 
Error-10 
Simple Linear Model 
- No break point 
SSE=1530.81 MSE=22.51 a=-
884.18       b=0.46 
SSE= 1354.87 MSE= 21.50 
a=-949.44, b=0.49 
219.80 
SSE=883.79 MSE=15.23 
a=-1085.03, b=0.56 
1084.60 
Model 2 
(Exponential  + 
Exponential-unrestricted) 
SSE=694.24 MSE=10.52 
Year=1964 
SSE=644.33 MSE=10.56 
Year=1964 
50.01 
SSE=466.23 MSE=8.32 
Year=1966 
425.60 
a1=-106.05      b1=0.056 a1=-106.05     b1=0.056 a1=-113.44    b1=0.059 
a2=-7.90          b2=0.006 a2=-8.07         b2=0.006 a2=-15.47      b2=0.010 
Model 5  
(Exponential + Linear-
restricted) 
SSE=694.66 MSE=10.37 
Year=1966 
SSE=644.70 MSE=10.39 
Year=1966 
50.02 
SSE=474.81 MSE=8.33 
Year=1966 
392.49 
a1=-112.37       b1=0.059 a1=-112.25     b1=0.059 a1=-107.22     b1=0.056 
a2=-356.76       b2=0.20 a2=-360.91     b2=0.19 a2=-539.16     b2=0.28 
Model 6 
(Exponential  + 
Exponential-restricted) 
SSE=699.45 MSE=10.44 
Year=1966 
SSE=649.44 MSE=10.47 
Year=1966 
50.19 
SSE=471.37 MSE=8.27 
Year=1966 
388.47 
a1=-133.48       b1=0.050 a1=-113.273    b1=0.059 a1=-107.95     b1=0.057 
a2=-8.13           b2=0.005 a2=-8.352        b2=0.006 a2=-14.25       b2=0.009 
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Oats-Estimation 
Model Estimation Result 
Break 
Year 
Ljung-Box Implied Growth Rate 
SSE/MSE 
Test 
Beginning of 
the Period 
End of the 
Period 
Simple Linear Model –No break point a=-924.51      b=0.49 -- Reject 1.39% 0.73% SSE=1283.23 MSE=18.87 
Simple Exponential Model –No break point a=-15.41         b=0.010 -- Reject 1.00% 1.00% SSE=1496.58 MSE=22.01 
Model 1 a1=-33.25       b1=0.019 
1972 
Reject 1.90% 1.90% 
SSE=1015.98 MSE=15.39 
(Exponential + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-739.38     b2=0.40 Fail to Reject 0.84% 0.59% 
Model 2 a1=-25.97       b1=0.015 
1964 
Fail to Reject 1.50% 1.50% 
SSE=1014.29 MSE=15.37 
(Exponential  + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-8.14         b2=0.006 Fail to Reject 0.60% 0.60% 
Model 3 a1=-1201.59   b1=0.64 
1986 
Fail to Reject 1.82% 1.14% 
SSE=1010.37 MSE=15.31 
(Linear + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-15.95       b2=0.010 Fail to Reject 1.00% 1.00% 
Model 4 a1=-1201.59   b1=0.64 
1986 
Fail to Reject 1.82% 1.14% 
SSE=1005.02 MSE=15.22 
(Linear + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-1136.82    b2=0.60 Fail to Reject 1.10% 0.89% 
Model 5 a1=-32.24        b1=0.018 
1968 
Reject 1.80% 1.80% 
SSE=1049.86 MSE=15.67 
(Exponential + Linear-restricted) a2=-642.59      b2=0.35 Fail to Reject 0.65% 0.52% 
Model 6 a1=-31.74        b1=0.018 
1969 
Fail to Reject 1.80% 1.80% 
SSE=1043.15 MSE=15.57 
(Exponential + Exponential-restricted) a2=-8.33          b2=0.006 Fail to Reject 0.65% 0.65% 
Model 7 a1=-1324.01     b1=0.70 
1970 
Fail to Reject 1.99% 1.42% 
SSE=1092.47 MSE=16.31 
(Linear + Exponential-restricted) a2=-8.85          b2=0.006 Fail to Reject 0.65% 0.65% 
Model 8 a1=-1329.01     b1=0.70 
1969 
Fail to Reject 1.99% 1.30% 
SSE=1096.74 MSE=16.37 
(Linear + Linear-restricted) a2=-669.48       b2=0.37 Fail to Reject 0.75% 0.55% 
Oats-Validation 
Model Estimation Result-0 Estimation Result-5 
Out of sample 
Prediction Error-
5 
Estimation Result-10 
Out of sample 
Prediction 
Error-10 
Simple Linear Model- 
No break point 
SSE=1283.23 MSE=18.87 a=-
924.51      b=0.49 
SSE=1224.99  MSE=19.44 
a=-955.27, b=0.51 
68.07 
SSE=1171.28 MSE=20.19 
a=-968.14, b=0.52 
132.12 
Model 2 
(Exponential  + 
Exponential-
unrestricted) 
SSE=1014.29 MSE=15.37 
Year=1964 
SSE=974.08 MSE=15.96 
Year=1986 
102.28 
SSE=914.12 MSE=16.32 
Year=1964 
128.34 
a1=-25.97       b1=0.015 a1=-24.36     b1=0.014 a1=-25.97     b1=0.015 
a2=-8.14         b2=0.006 a2=-21.58     b2=0.013 a2=-6.46       b2=0.005 
Model 4 
(Linear + Linear-
unrestricted) 
SSE=1005.02 MSE=15.22 
Year=1986 
SSE=954.24 MSE=15.64 
Year=1986 
87.25 
SSE=901.96 MSE=16.10 
Year=1986 
187.57 
a1=-1201.59   b1=0.64 a1=-1201.59    b1=0.63 a1=-1201.59    b1=0.63 
a2=-1136.82    b2=0.60 a2= -1437.57   b2=0.75 a2=-1582.27    b2=0.82 
Model 6 
(Exponential + 
Exponential-restricted) 
SSE=1043.15 MSE=15.57 
Year=1969 
SSE=1012.48 MSE=15.57 
Year=1969 
30.66 
SSE=944.48 MSE=16.57 
Year=1969 
124.14 
a1=-31.74        b1=0.018 a1=-31.78        b1=0.018 a1=-32.58        b1=0.019 
a2=-8.33          b2=0.006 a2=-8.30          b2=0.006 a2=-6.72          b2=0.005 
  
 
 
1
2
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 Barley-Estimation 
Model Estimation Result 
Break 
Year 
Ljung-Box Implied Growth Rate 
SSE/MSE 
Test 
Beginning of 
the Period 
End of the 
Period 
Simple Linear Model –No break point a=-1258.70    b=0.66 -- Reject 2.87% 0.90% SSE=909.88 MSE=13.38 
Simple Exponential Model –No break point a=-25.19         b=0.015 -- Reject 1.50% 1.50% SSE=1214.70 MSE=17.86 
Model 1 a1=-37.34       b1=0.021 
1984 
Reject 2.10% 2.10% 
SSE=767.61 MSE=11.63 
(Exponential + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-1107.49   b2=0.58 Fail to Reject 1.14% 0.79% 
Model 2 a1=-37.96       b1=0.021 
1984 
Reject 2.10% 2.10% 
SSE=771.58 MSE=11.69 
(Exponential  + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-16.44       b2=0.010 Fail to Reject 1.00% 1.00% 
Model 3 a1=-843.41     b1=0.45 
1963 
Fail to Reject 1.96% 1.29% 
SSE=776.61 MSE=11.77 
(Linear + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-18.21       b2=0.011 Reject 1.10% 1.10% 
Model 4 a1=-843.41     b1=0.45 
1963 
Fail to Reject 1.96% 1.29% 
SSE=772.59 MSE=11.70 
(Linear + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-1107.49    b2=0.58 Reject 1.54% 0.79% 
Model 5 a1=-42.21        b1=0.023 
1969 
Reject 2.30% 2.30% 
SSE=831.85 MSE=12.42 
(Exponential + Linear-restricted) a2=-1136.03     b2=0.60 Reject 1.40% 0.82% 
Model 6 a1=-36.66         b1=0.020 
1979 
Reject 2.00% 2.00% 
SSE=833.01 MSE=12.43 
(Exponential + Exponential-restricted) a2=-15.08        b2=0.010 Reject 0.90% 0.90% 
Model 7 a1=-1357.15     b1=0.71 
1982 
Reject 3.09% 1.24% 
SSE=873.54 MSE=13.04 
(Linear + Exponential-restricted) a2=-16.25         b2=0.010 Fail to Reject 1.00% 1.00% 
Model 8 a1=-1353.66     b1=0.71 
1981 
Reject 3.09% 1.35% 
SSE=884.07 MSE=13.15 
(Linear + Linear-restricted) a2=-1088.21     b2=0.57 Reject 1.00% 0.78% 
Barley-Validation 
Model Estimation Result-0 Estimation Result-5 
Out of sample 
Prediction Error-5 
Estimation Result-10 
Out of sample 
Prediction 
Error-10 
Simple Linear Model- 
No break point 
SSE=909.88 MSE=13.38 
a=-1258.70    b=0.66 
SSE= 821.66 MSE= 13.04 
a=-1269.18, b=0.67 
89.40 
SSE=700.75 MSE=12.08 
a=-1297.18, b=0.68 
225.69 
Model 1 
(Exponential + Linear-
unrestricted) 
SSE=767.61 MSE=11.63 
Year=1984 
SSE=681.63 MSE=11.17 
Year=1963 
87.50 
SSE=561.84 MSE=10.03 
Year=1984 
320.42 
a1=-37.34       b1=0.021 a1=-28.77           b1=0.016 a1=-37.34       b1=0.021 
a2=-1107.49   b2=0.58 a2=-1093.01       b2=0.58 a2=-1767.81   b2=0.92 
Model 5 
(Exponential + Linear-
restricted) 
SSE=831.85 MSE=12.42 
Year=1969 
SSE=745.76 MSE=12.02 
Year=1969 
86.26 
SSE=636.82 MSE=11.17 
Year=1969 
198.24 
a1=-42.21        b1=0.023 a1=-42.37       b1=0.023 a1=-41.97       b1=0.023 
a2=-1136.03     b2=0.60 a2=-1127.02   b2=0.59 a2=-1165.72   b2=0.61 
Model 6 
(Exponential + 
Exponential-restricted) 
SSE=833.01 MSE=12.43 
Year=1979 
SSE=746.20 MSE=12.02 
Year=1979 
88.97 
SSE=640.08 MSE=11.23 
Year=1970 
227.37 
a1=-36.66         b1=0.020 a1=-36.94       b1=0.021 a1=-42.21       b1=0.023 
a2=-15.08         b2=0.010 a2=-14.33       b2=0.009 a2=-19.97       b2=0.012 
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Hay-Estimation 
Model Estimation Result 
Break 
Year 
Ljung-Box Implied Growth Rate 
SSE/MSE 
Test 
Beginning of 
the Period 
End of the 
Period 
Simple Linear Model –No break point a=-38.00        b=0.02 -- Reject 1.53% 0.81% SSE=1.62 MSE=0.023 
Simple Exponential Model –No break point a=-18.02         b=0.009 -- Reject 0.90% 0.90% SSE=2.21 MSE=0.032 
Model 1 a1=-31.03       b1=0.016 
1982 
Reject 1.60% 1.60% 
SSE=0.619 MSE=0.009 
(Exponential + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-3.45         b2=0.003 Fail to Reject 0.13% 0.12% 
Model 2 a1=-31.03       b1=0.016 
1982 
Reject 1.60% 1.60% 
SSE=0.619 MSE=0.009 
(Exponential  + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-1.50         b2=0.001 Fail to Reject 0.10% 0.10% 
Model 3 a1=-50.74       b1=0.027 
1977 
Reject 2.06% 1.24% 
SSE=0.663 MSE=0.010 
(Linear + Exponential-unrestricted) a2=-2.12         b2=0.002 Reject 0.20% 0.20% 
Model 4 a1=-50.74       b1=0.027 
1977 
Reject 2.06% 1.24% 
SSE=0.663 MSE=0.010 
(Linear + Linear-unrestricted) a2=-4.94         b2=0.004 Fail to Reject 0.17% 0.16% 
Model 5 a1=-43.25       b1=0.022 
1959 
Reject 2.20% 2.20% 
SSE=1.332 MSE=0.020 
(Exponential + Linear-restricted) a2=-31.33       b2=0.017 Reject 0.97% 0.69% 
Model 6 a1=-30.52       b1=0.016 
1982 
Reject 1.60% 1.60% 
SSE=0.624 MSE=0.009 
(Exponential + Exponential-restricted) a2=-0.59         b2=0.0007 Fail to Reject 0.07% 0.07% 
Model 7 a1=-53.17       b1=0.028 
1984 
Reject 2.14% 1.14% 
SSE=0.681 MSE=0.010 
(Linear + Exponential-restricted) a2=-1.009       b2=0.0009 Fail to Reject 0.09% 0.09% 
Model 8 a1=-53.16       b1=0.028 
1984 
Reject 2.14% 1.14% 
SSE=0.681 MSE=0.010 
(Linear + Linear-restricted) a2=-1.573       b2=0.002 Fail to Reject 0.08% 0.08% 
Hay-Validation 
Model Estimation Result-0 Estimation Result-5 
Out of sample 
Prediction Error-
5 
Estimation Result-10 
Out of sample 
Prediction 
Error-10 
Simple Linear Model- 
No break point 
SSE=1.62 MSE=0.023 
a=-38.00        b=0.02 
SSE=1.11  MSE=0.018 
a=-42.10, b=0.022 
0.684 
SSE=0.811 MSE=0.014 
a=-45.58, b=0.024 
1.417 
Model 2 
(Exponential + 
Exponential-
unrestricted) 
SSE=0.619 MSE=0.009 Year=1982 
SSE=0.559 MSE=0.009 
Year=1986 
0.158 
SSE=0.466 MSE= 0.008 
Year=1987 
1.523 
a1=-31.03       b1=0.016 a1=-29.95       b1=0.016 a1=-29.50       b1=0.015 
a2=-1.50         b2=0.001 a2=-8.90         b2=0.005 a2=-25.16       b2=0.013 
Model 8 
(Exponential + 
Exponential-restricted) 
SSE=0.624 MSE=0.009 
Year=1982 
SSE=0.583 MSE=0.009 
Year=1981 
0.071 
SSE=0.544 MSE=3.96 
Year=1979 
0.243 
a1=-30.52       b1=0.016 a1=-30.64       b1=0.016 a1=-31.28       b1=0.016 
a2=-0.59         b2=0.0007 a2=-3.48         b2=0.002 a2=-7.06         b2=0.004 
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APPENDIX B 
Full Characterization of Solutions of the Two-Type model 
Let the subscripts 1 and 2 denote the Non-additional producers and the Additional 
producers respectively. 
1. First-best Case  
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2) Contract with price specification only (ti, Si) 
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3. Non-screening Contracts 
1) Uniform price method 
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2) Baseline method 
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It is not clear what the production allocation would be and there may not be equilibrium. 
But with ancillary constraints, the supply function can be smoothed. 
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APPENDIX C 
Analytical Derivation of Numerical Results 
C.1 Comparison between the total cost of Baseline_low and Baseline_both 
If 
2
2
2
1 1
1 1
4 2


 
 

, 
Baseline _both Baseline _low
0TC TC Q  . 
If 
2
2
2
1 1
1 1
4 2


 
 

, 
* *Baseline _both Baseline
0 0
_low Baseline _both Baseline _low
0Q , Q ,TC TC Q TC TC ,otherwise   . 
[Proof]  
 
 
 
low
low
both
Baseline 21
0
1
Baseline
1
0
0 1
2 Baseline _ low
1
2
10
2
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 0Baseline 1 1 2 0
2
2 1 1 22 1 1 2
Baseline _ both
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1
02
0 2 1 1 2
TC Q
2TC
Q
Q
2TC
Q
2 Q 2 Q
TC
2 [ 2 ] 2TC
Q
Q ( )
Q






         
      
       
   







    

 
 
 
 
1 2
2 1 1 2
2 Baseline _ both
1 2 2 1 1 1 2
2 2
0 2 1 1 2
2 [ 2 ]TC
Q
Q
( )
 
   
      
   

 

 
 
If 
 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1
2
12 1 1 2
2 [ 2 ] 2
( )
       
   
 


, Then, 
128 
 
 
 
 
 0 0
Baseline _ both Baseline _ low
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
0 0 02
0 2 1 1 2 1 02 1 1 2
Q Q
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
02
0 02 1 1 2 12 1 1 2
Baseline _ both B
2 [ 2 ] 2 2TC TC
Q Q , Q
Q Q( )
2 [ 2 ] 2 2
q dq qdq, Q
( )
T TC
Q
C
Q          
       
          
       
  
    
  
 
   




 aseline _ low 0, Q
 
 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1
2
12 1 1 2
2 [ 2 ] 2
( )
       
   
 


needs 
 
 
 
 
   
     
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 21
2 2
1 12 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
2
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
2
1 1 2 1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 1
                                    
2 2 22 1
2
a 2a 1 a a
2a a a a
      
            
        
          
      
    
          
 
      
       
   
 
2 2
1 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
2 2 2
1 1 2 1 2
2 2 2
1 1 2
2
2
1 2
2
2
1
                                                                       
2a
a a a
a a 1
1 1
a a
4 4
1 1
a
2 4
1 1
4 2
.
 
a
  
    
    
  
 


 
  
    
    
 
    
 
 

 
 
As figure C.1 shows, the first derivative of  Baseline _bothTC  represented by the line 
DC is greater than that of  Baseline _lowTC  represented by the line OB everywhere. For a 
given target Q0 (OA),  
Baseline _bothTC equals the area of OACD and  Baseline _lowTC  equals 
the area of OAB.  Baseline _bothTC  is greater than  Baseline _lowTC  everywhere and it is 
always optimal to leave the additional type out of the program.  
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Figure C.1: Derivatives of  Baseline _bothTC  and  Baseline _lowTC without Interception. 
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Baseline _both Baseline _low **
0 0TC TC Q Q   
The first derivative of  Baseline _bothTC   is greater than that of  Baseline _lowTC  when 
Q0 is small but increases slower as Q0 keeps increasing.  When Q0 is larger than   
 , it 
will less than that of  Baseline _lowTC . And as Q0 keeps increasing, the cost minimization 
solution will switch from leaving the additional type out of the program to being open to 
both types at 
**
0 0Q Q  (figure C.2). 
 
Figure C.2: Derivatives of  Baseline _bothTC  and  Baseline _lowTC with Interception. 
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C.2 Cost effectiveness comparisons 
1) Screening contract with price and quantity specifications (a) versus 
screening contract with price specifications only (b): a bTC TC   
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where a a
1 2
a( q ,q )
TC is the total cost of the screening contract scheme with price and quantity 
specifications at the allocation where the total cost is minimized. b b
1 2
'
a( q ,q )
TC   is the total 
cost of the screening contract scheme with price and quantity specifications at the 
allocation where the total cost of the screening contract scheme with price specifications 
only is minimized. b b
1 2
b( q ,q )
TC  is the total cost of the screening contract scheme with price 
specifications only at the allocation where the total cost of the screening contract scheme 
with price specifications only is minimized. 
The first inequality is established by the nature of the minimization problem.  
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The second inequality is established as follows: 
Given the target Q0 with α1 and α2, for any allocation (q1, q2) that satisfies 
1 1 2 2 0( q ) q QQ    ,  
TC=α1*(Production cost of producing q1 + Information Rent)+α2*Production cost of 
producing q2, where information rent is no less than the profit of mimicking the 
additional producers which is always greater under the screening contract with price 
specification only. In figure C.3, suppose the optimal production quantity for the 
Additional type is q2, under the screening contract scheme with price and quantity 
specifications, information rent paid to the Non-additional producers equals the 
production cost difference between the two types (i.e. the area of O ADQ ). Under the 
screening contract scheme with price specifications only, to induce the Additional 
producers to produce q2 the unit payment needs to be set at t2=OE and the lump-sum that 
the producers need to pay back equals to the area of OED. If the Non-additional 
producers choose to mimic the Additional producers, he would produce   
  instead of q2 
and receive information rent equals the area of O CDQ . And it is clear that the area of 
O ADQ  is less than the area of O CDQ . 
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Figure C.3: Information Rent under Different Variants of Screening Contract Schemes 
2) Screening contract with price specifications (a) versus optimal baseline (b): 
a bTC TC   
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In figure C.4, the segmented line OAB is the first derivative of the aTC  and 
therefore for given target Q0, aTC  equals the area underneath the line. The lines OAE 
and CD are the first derivatives of Baseline _ lowTC    and Baseline _bothTC  respectively and 
accordingly the areas underneath these two lines represent Baseline _ lowTC  and 
134 
 
 
 
Baseline _bothTC . As OAB is the lowest line among the three (See Detail 1 and 2 below), it 
follows that:  
 Baseline _ low Baseline _ lo Baseline _ low Baseline _botha bwa a TC TC min TC ,TCTC TC , and TC TC     . 
 
Figure C.4: Total Costs of Screening Contract with Price Specifications versus Optimal 
Baseline 
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Detail 2: CD OABy y q    
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3) Optimal baseline (a) versus baseline_business as usual (b): a bTC TC . 
[Proof]: by the nature of the minimization problem. 
4) Baseline_business as usual (a) versus uniform price (b):  
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C.3 Convergence of ratio of total costs of different methods relative to that of the 
first best case as Q0 goes to infinity 
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C.4 Convergence as 1 0   and 1 1    
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         
           

    
   

    
   
   
 

 
1
2
2
OptimalBaseline 21
0
1
1 1
1 1
4 2lim 1 TC Q



 
 
    
Then 
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1
21
0OptimalBaseline
2 11
FirstBest 2
1
2 1 1 21 2 0
2 1 1 2
Q
TC
lim 1
TC Q

 
    
   

  


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APPENDIX D 
The Case with Continuous Distributed Producers 
Set up and solve for the case in which the producers are continuously distributed. 
The total cost curves are: 
  2TC ( q )    , where the possibility density function of θis f(θ) with 
0,    .  
1. First-best Complete Information Case 
   
   
( t ,q ) 0
min T f d

 
    [D.1] 
Subject to 
    2T ( q )      [D.2] 
     0
0
q f d Q

      [D.3] 
Substitute [D.2] into [D.1], the problem can be simplified as: 
 
   2
q 0
min ( q ) f d


      [D.4] 
Subject to 
     0
0
q f d Q

    
.
 [D.5] 
Then the Lagrangian function of the problem is: 
        2( q ) f q fL( ,q( ))            
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Applying the Euler equation: 
d L L
( ) 0
d q( )' q( )  
 
 
 
 
L
0
q( )'



 and  
L
f ( )[ 2 ]
q(
(
)
q )   





  
Therefore,    0 f ( )[ 2 ) q0( q
2
]

     

       . And substitute this 
into the problem and the solution can be found as follows: 
  0q Q    
  20T Q   
2
0TC Q  
2. Screening Contract Methods 
2.1 Screening Contract Method with Price and Quantity Specifications 
Following the example in Laffont and Martimort (2002), we first derive the 
incentive compatible constraint. Denote the schedule of total payment and production 
quantity which is a function of θas (T(θ), q(θ)). The decision problem for producer of 
type θ is to choose the pair of    (T ,q )   so as to maximize his profit (equation 
[D.6]): 
    2
ˆ
ˆ ˆmaxT ( q )

     . [D.6]  
For any producer to honestly announce its true type, it follows: 
       2 ' ' 2T ( q ) T ( q ) , ( , ')                [D.7] 
       ' 2 2T ' ( q ') T ( q ') , ( , ')               . [D.8] 
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Adding [D.7] and [D.8], we obtain: 
     ' '( q q ) 0      . [D.9] 
Incentive compatibility alone requires that q(θ) is non-decreasing in θ. T 
implies that q() and t() are differentiable almost everywhere. With differentiability, we 
can further derive that for the producers to honestly announce its true type, (T(θ), q(θ)) 
satisfies: 
  
 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ
qT( )
2 q 0
ˆ ˆ

 


 
 



  
 
. [D.10] 
 Equation [D.10] is the first order condition of profit maximization decision of producer 
of type θ, which is also the incentive compatible constraint of the regulator’s problem. 
Rewrite [D.10] as follows: 
  T'( ) 2 q q'( ) 0        [D.11] 
Then the regulator’s problem can be formulated as follow: 
   
   
( t ,q ) 0
min T f d

 
    [D.12] 
Subject to 
  T'( ) 2 q q'( ) 0        [D.13] 
    2T ( q ) 0       [D.14] 
    2T 0 ( q 0 0 ) 0    [D.15] 
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     0
0
q f d Q

      [D.16] 
The problem is easier to solve by defining:       2u T ( q )       . Then 
we have       2T u ( q )       . And the problem can be rewritten as follow: 
   
     2
( u ,q ) 0
min [u ( q ) ] f d



        [D.17] 
Subject to 
         u' T'( ) 2 q ( q' 1) 2 q               [D.18] 
u( ) 0   [D.19] 
u(0 ) 0  [D.20] 
     0
0
q f d Q

      [D.21] 
Therefore, 
           2
0 0 0
u u 0 u' d 2 q d 2 q d
  
                   [D.22] 
The problem can be simplified as follow: 
 
     
  
 
   2 2 2 2
q 0 0 0
2 1 F
min [ 2 q d ( q ) ] f d [ q( ) ( q ) ] f d
f


 
               


        
 [D.23] 
Subject to 
     0
0
q f d Q

      [D.24] 
The solution is: 
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  0
0
1 F( )
q Q (1 F( ))d
f ( )
 
   


      
    0
0 0
1 F( )
u 2 Q 1 F d 2 d
f ( )
  
     

  
     
 
 
     20 0
0 0 0
1 F( ) 1 F( )
T 2 Q 1 F d 2 d (Q (1 F( ))d )
f ( ) f ( )
   
        
 
   
          
 
 
  
 
 
22
0
0 0
1 F
TC Q 1 F d f ( )d
f
  
     

  
       
   
 
If θfollows uniform distribution, then 1f ( )

  and F( )



 . And 
  0q Q 2
2
 

    
  20u ( 2 Q )       
 
2
2
0T [ Q 2 2 ]
2
  


 
    
 
 
2
2
0 0TC ( Q Q )
12

    
2.2 Screening Contract Method with Price Specification Only 
Again, we first derive the incentive compatible constraint. Denote the schedule of 
unit payment and lump sum transfer which is a function of θas (t(θ), S(θ)). The 
decision problem for producer of type θ is to choose the pair of    ( t , )ˆ S ˆ   (and 
determine the production quantity) so as to maximize his profit (Equation [D.25]): 
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 
             
 
 
   
 
ˆ
ˆ
2
t
2
t
maxq t S q 2 q tˆ
t t
max( )t S (
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ,where 
ˆ ˆ
2
ˆ )
2
ˆ


     
 
 
   
   
 
    
     
. [D.25] 
For the producers to honestly announce its true type, (t(θ), S(θ)) satisfies: 
     
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ
t t St( )
0
2 ˆ
    
  
  


  
 
  
  
.  [D.26] 
Equation [D.26] is the first order condition of profit maximization decision of producer 
of type θ, which is also the incentive compatible constraint of the regulator’s problem. 
Rewrite [D.26] as follows: 
t( )
t'( ) t'( ) S'( ) 0
2

   

   . [D.27] 
Then the regulator’s problem can be formulated as follow: 
   
   
( t ,S ) 0
min [ q( )t S( )] f d

 
      [D.28] 
Subject to 
t( )
t'( ) t'( ) S'( ) 0
2

   

    [D.29] 
  2q( )t S( ) ( q( ) ) 0          [D.30] 
      2t 0 q 0 S 0 q(0 ) 0    [D.31] 
    0
0
q( ) f d Q

      [D.32] 
    2 q t      [D.33] 
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Substitute q(θ) as a function of t(θ), then the problem can be rewritten as 
follow: 
   
 
   
2
( t ,S ) 0
t
min [ t S( )] f d
2

 

    

   [D.34] 
Subject to 
t( )
t'( ) t'( ) S'( ) 0
2

   

    [D.35] 
 
 
 
2
2t tt S( ) ( ) 0
2 2
 
   
 
     [D.36] 
2t(0 )
S(0 ) 0
4
   [D.37] 
 
  0
0
t
f d Q
2
 
 

 
  
 
. [D.38] 
First minimize [D.34] with constraint [D.35] and [D.38]. Then the Lagrangian function 
is: 
 
   
 
 
2
t tt( )
[ t S( )] f [ t'( ) t'( ) S'( )] [ f ]
2 2 2
L
 
          
  
 
       
 
   [D.39]  
Then the two Euler equations are: 
 
 
 
'
t fd L L t( )
' t'( ) ' f t'( ) 0
d t 2 2 2 2t
   
      
  

  
   
           
   
 [D.40] 
 '
d L L
' f 0
d sS
 

  
     
 
 [D.41] 
Then, we obtain 
 
   t f ( ) f
2 2
  
 



   [D.42] 
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 ' f ( )    [D.43] 
Therefore, 
 
 ( t ) f '( )
t' 2
f ( )
  
 


 
.
 [D.44] 
Equation [D.44] suggests that to get an analytical solution for the problem, the 
distribution of θ needs to be known. If θfollows uniform distribution, then  
1
f 

  
and  F 


 . Then 
 t' 2  . [D.45] 
The solution is: 
  0t 2 (Q )
2
 

    
 
2
0 0S Q 2 (Q )
2 2
   
  
     
 
 
2
2
0 0TC ( Q Q )
12

    
3. Uniform Price Method 
The regulator’s problem can be formulated as follow: 
 
 
( t ,q ) 0
min tq( ) f d


    [D.46] 
Subject to 
  2 q t     [D.47] 
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     0
0
q f d Q

      [D.48] 
The solution is: 
  0q Q    
0t 2 Q  
2
0 0
0
TC 2 Q 2 Q f ( )d

        
If θfollows uniform distribution, then  
1
f 

  and  F 


 . And 
2
0 0TC ( 2Q Q )  . 
4. Optimal Baseline Method 
Again, the regulator needs to decide whether to leave some high costs producers 
out of the program. Let Qˆ  and t denote the baseline and unit payment determined by the 
regulator. Then let qlow and θlow denote the production quantity and additionality 
parameter for the active producers with highest costs:  
2
low low low
ˆ( ) Qq t( q )     [D.49] 
Therefore, 
low
ˆ t
4
Q

  . 
Then the regulator’s problem can be formulated as follow: 
   
Qˆ
Qˆ
( ,t ) t
4
min t( q ) f dQˆ


  

  [D.50] 
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Subject to 
  2 q t     [D.51] 
   
4
Qˆ
t
( q ) f d


   

  [D.52] 
Qˆ
t
0
4
   [D.53] 
Solution 
  0 0
0 0
Q , Qq
Q , Q
 
 
   
  
 
0 0
0 0
2 Q , Q
2 Q , Q
t 







 


 
0
0
0
0
Q
, Q
2
Q
, Q ?
2
Qˆ

 

 
 


 


 
3
2
0
2
0 0
0
0
0
TC
Q 2 Q f ( )d ,
2 Q , Q
Q

 
    





 
  

 
If θfollows uniform distribution, then  
1
f 

  and  F 


 . And 
3
2
0 0
2
0 0 0
TC
,
2 Q , Q
Q Q Q

 
 
 
  


 
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